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Community-based natural resource management has been advocated for by 
many scholar and environmentalists to improve natural resources 
management, equity, and justice for local people. However, its 
implementation on the ground does not always reach the intended goal. This 
is because poor policies and institutions have led to undemocratic systems 
that empower elite control and capture. Studies perceive elites to be in full 
control of decision-making which is not the case. This study ‘unpacks the 
elite’ to gain new insight into how the mechanisms of elite control and capture 
operate. I use the concept of capital and the choice and recognition framework 
to build a foundation for studying how elite power is produced and exercised 
as a result of both the social context and institutional interventions. I used 
qualitative and quantitative methods in data collection to capture the life 
experiences of actors and ensure the reliability and validity of the study. The 
findings reveal elites use their capital to gain control of governing systems. 
In democratic systems, however, elites find it difficult to control and capture 
resources because engaged citizenship can hold them accountable. Elites are 
responsive to the public in circumstances where they risk losing or gaining 
symbolic capital. This means that elites are responsive to the pubic even in 
autocracies. Key policy changes are needed that considers the social and 
political context of the local community members in community-based 
initiatives. 
Keywords: Elite control, Elite capture, Local democracy, Community-based natural 
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Over the years, there has been a challenge with the management of natural resource 
areas in Southern Africa. Countries have shifted from state managed areas to co-
management between state and local community, and to Community-based natural 
resources management that is based on local community collective action (Mbewe, 
2007). Community-based natural resources management (CBNRM) has been 
viewed by many scholars as a way to empower communities democratically to 
improve local natural resources management (Fabricius and Koch, 2004, Mulale et 
al., 2013, Lubilo, 2018). More effective and democratic governance of natural 
resources has the potential to promote gender equality and empowerment of women 
through participation; reduce inequality within countries; and promote protection, 
restoration and sustainable use of terrestrial ecosystems halting biodiversity loss 
(Ribot, 2004).  
These goals are achieved by promoting equity, participation, transparency, and 
accountability in the management of natural resources (Ribot, 2004). However, 
existing research shows that local elites often gain disproportionate control over 
governance processes, leading to inequitable outcomes and undermining effective 
natural resource governance (Ribot, 2004, Lubilo, 2018). Varying definitions have 
been given for elites but as Khan (2012) suggests these can be classified into two, 
which is, elites relative to the power and resources they possess and elites who 
occupy a dominant position within social relations.  
A study on the factors leading to the empowerment of ‘elites’ over decision 
making processes is key to understanding CBNRM politics and social structure. 
Accordingly, this study will seek to answer two main questions, which is, how do 
‘elites’ gain control over decision-making processes in the governance of 
community-based natural resources? And under what conditions are ‘elites’ 
responsive to the public in the governance of community-based natural resources? 
Local democracy requires key policy and institutions that lead to good governance 
and decision-making processes (Öjendal and Dellnäs, 2013). If this is absent it may 
lead to elite capture and/or undemocratic, inequitable, and unsustainable outcomes. 
1.1 Research problem 
Participatory Community-based natural resource management has been advocated 
for by many scholars and environmentalists to improve natural resource 
management, equity, and justice for local people (Ribot, 2002). Beard and Dasgupta 
(2006) observed that international development has increasingly favoured local 
planning over central planning hence the decentralisation movement around the 
world. However, its implementation on the ground does not always reach the 
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intended goal. One of the criticisms that have emerged is that community-based 
initiatives allow the state to abandon its responsibility for community development 
by placing unfair demands of scarce resources of the poor (Beard, 2018). Even more 
so, local democratic leaders in some cases are not given discretionary powers that 
are required to make them accountable to their people (Ribot, 2013).  When leaders 
are not accountable it is likely that elite control occurs making community-based 
natural resource management vulnerable to capture by local elites (Beard, 2018). 
The actions and interactions elites take and have, play a vital role in influencing 
the political development and governance of communities. In democratic 
governance, there should be interlocking networks of communication and influence 
that allows access to central decision making for all (Osei, 2018). This means that 
if local people are unable to sanction their leaders through formal processes like 
elections or informal processes that consider one's reputation within the community 
(Fischer, 2016), it would result in poor participation from marginalised groups such 
as women and other socially disadvantaged individuals in the culturally thick 
communities1. Elites in non-democracies are more centralised in decision making 
and are recruited from a small social segment excluding anyone seen as an opponent 
leading to mistrust and lack of cooperation between those in power and those 
opposing (Osei, 2018). This could explain why Westholm (2016) observed that 
Women are usually underrepresented in natural resource management and have little 
influence over decision-making or office-bearing at community meetings 
worldwide.  
Local elites which include politicians, monetary wealthy, and traditional leaders 
frequently dominate and frustrate decentralization and other community-based 
management initiatives by pursing their own political and material interests 
(Wilfahrt, 2018, Lubilo, 2018). Some studies have shown that this is due to poor 
institutions and policies while others have attributed elite domination to the 
legitimization of elites by state and international Non-Government Organisations 
(NGOs) because of an implicit assumption that elites share preference about local 
representation in decentralized governance. However, in decentralization elites have 
to maintain and reinforce their social status in their communities at the same time 
as they have to negotiate the distribution of scarce resources within the local 
government (Wilfahrt, 2018). This ultimately results in elite capture where the local 
government is rendered a zero-sum game as elites capture rewards for themselves 
and village (ibid).   
Elites have been explored in many kinds of literature on local natural resource 
management, most scholars tend to focus on how dimensions of elite capture 
marginalize less powerful social groups. Less work has been done to understand 
who these elites are, their varying backgrounds and aspirations, and how they seek 
                                            
1 Communities that mostly depend on informal institutions in their social structures. 
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to maintain their positions of power. Studies perceive elites to be in full control of 
decision making where they are responsive only to their local communities which 
may not be the whole picture. Elites are expected to also be responsive to the 
organisations that legitimize their authority like the state or international Non-
Government Organisations (NGOs) to meet decentralization objective which 
creates a conflict of interest with local communities. Much has been said about elite 
capture and some of the dynamics that enable it as mentioned but by ‘unpacking the 
elite’ there is a possibility of gaining new insight into how these mechanisms 
operate. 
1.2 Purpose of the study 
The purpose of this study was to understand who the local elites are in Community-
Based Natural Resource Management (CBNRM) politics and social structure from 
a local perspective. This was done by exploring how elites gain control over 
decision-making processes in the democratic governance of community-based 
natural resources. Additionally, the study explored the conditions under which the 
elites are responsive to the public. In answering the two questions I was able to 
identify who the marginalized group is in the community which is the women.  I 
answered the two main questions using the following sub questions. 
• Who are elites in relation to identity and their background? 
• How are decisions made in CBNRM?  
• Whose interests do the decisions made benefit? And; 
• How does the public interact with the elites in decision-making positions? 
In line with Creswell (2014) on transformative worldview research, I link the 
political and social action from actors to understand who the elites in CBRNM are 
by finding out how they gain decision making power. For the development of the 
action agenda, I explore the conditions under which these elites are responsive to 
the public. Therefore, in designing the research it was essential that I study the lives 
and experiences of elites, the people they dominate, and institution that empower 
the elites either directly or indirectly. This would be beneficial for understanding 
the key policy and institutional changes needed in governance and decision-making 
processes which are essential elements of local democracy.  
Greater knowledge of elites will help to reduce elite control and capture and help 
lead to policy mechanisms that have more democratic, equitable, and sustainable 
outcomes. A policy brief will be used to disseminate my findings and to make 
recommendations for policy makers in Zambia and for people working on CBNRM 
initiatives elsewhere in the world for the promotion of gender equality and 
empowerment of women through participation; reduce inequality within countries; 
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and promote protection, restoration and sustainable use of terrestrial ecosystems 
halting biodiversity loss in line with the sustainable development goals (UNDP, 
2019). 
1.3 Focus of the study 
In this study, I focused on the findings that most relate to my research problem and 
the purpose of the study to answer the two main questions I have proposed. In my 
fieldwork, however, I found further interesting issues on local democracy, 
community-based natural resources management, and the influence of civil society 
organisations and government on their governance. This information was collected 
in the many conversations I had with local community members during interviews 
and focus groups. At the end of this thesis, I have suggested some of the issues as 
topics for further studies. 
1.4 Outline of the thesis 
I have structured my thesis as follows. Chapter 2 gives the context of the study by 
providing information about the management of natural resources in Zambia 
focusing on wildlife management. It further gives a historical account of the 
governance structures and institutions and gives the current situation of the wildlife 
resources management. To conclude the chapter, I give a description of the study 
site. 
 In Chapter 3, I outline the conceptual framework which I have used to interpret 
my empirical data. I first give a description of elites, elite control, and elite capture. 
Then I introduce the concept of capital and institutional choice and recognition 
framework. Lastly, I link the concept of capital with the choice and recognition 
framework for the purpose of data analysis in this study. Following this will be my 
chapter 4 which explains my methodology giving my research design, methods I 
used for my data collection and lastly, the selection of the study site.  
In chapter 5 I present my empirical findings. I first use my findings to answer 
the first three sub-questions and the first main question on how elites gain control 
over decision making processes. Chapter 5 also gives an answer to the last sub-
question as well as the main question on the conditions under which elites are 
responsive to the public.  
In chapter 6, there is a discussion of the findings using the conceptual framework 
and existing literature. Lastly, chapter 7 gives my conclusion by summarising my 
findings and further highlighting the contribution my study makes to existing 






This part provides contextual information about the management of natural 
resources in Zambia with a focus on wildlife resources. It gives the historical 
background of the governance structures, the institutions in place and the current 
situation of the management of wildlife resources. Lastly, it gives a description of 
the study site. 
2.1 Historical background of governance in Game Management 
Areas 
Zambia has 20 National parks and 34 Game Management Areas (GMAs) which are 
reserved for wildlife protection and amount to about 30% of Zambia’s land (Zambia 
Tourism Agency, 2017). Zambia follows mainly two tenure systems which are 
leasehold tenure that is practiced on state land and customary tenure that is practiced 
on customary land. Under customary tenure land rights are controlled and allocated 
by traditional authorities and practices (Republic of Zambia, 2015). This means that 
they vary according to the traditional customs, social norms, and attitudes to land 
(ibid). Although the National parks sit on customary land, they are managed and 
protected by the state/government while the Game Management Areas also on 
customary land are managed both by the state and local communities. This is 
because the National Parks have been gazetted as protected areas (an area for 
conservation and protection of wildlife, ecological systems, and biological 
diversity) and therefore settlement is not allowed while the Game Management 
Areas are gazetted as buffer zones to the protected areas and so settlement is allowed 
(Government of Zambia, 2015).   
The buffer zone allows for sustainable utilisation of wildlife resources in the area 
hence the co-management between the state and local communities. Accordingly, 
under the Zambia Wildlife Act of 1998 and 2015, the local communities form 
Community Resource Boards (CRBs) within the boundaries of their chiefdoms in 
the Game Management Areas. These CRBs provide an institutional structure that is 
legally binding for the management and conservation of wildlife resources. 
Additionally, they are a means of ensuring that benefits from the management of 
wildlife resources are available to the local communities encouraging the 
participation and responsibility of those communities (Government of Zambia, 
2015).  
Community-Based Natural Resources Management (CBNRM) initiatives in 
southern Africa were introduced in the 1980s as a strategy to ensure that wildlife 
resources were not decimated by local communities because of restrictions to access 
and use imposed by colonial powers (Fabricius and Koch, 2004, Lubilo, 2018). 
Accordingly, sustainable use projects were implemented such as Communal Areas 
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Management Programme for Indigenous Resources (CAMPFIRE) in Zimbabwe, 
Administrative Management Design for Game Management Areas (ADMADE), 
and Luangwa Integrated Resources Development Project (LIRDP) both in Zambia 
(Child, 1996, Fabricius and Koch, 2004, Lubilo and Child, 2010). These projects 
were among many others in different countries that aimed to increase community 
participation in natural resources management with improved use and access. Prior 
to the inception of CRBs, the ADMADE programme was implemented nationwide 
by the State’s National Parks and Wildlife Service (NPWS) (Lubilo and Child, 
2010). Unlike the CRB programme, the ADMADE was not legally recognised. 
Furthermore, unlike the LIRDP programme implemented only in South Luangwa 
ecosystem that gave 80% of revenues generated from wildlife resources to the local 
communities through Village Action Groups (VAGs), the ADMADE was managed 
top-down (ibid).  
Under the ADMADE, a Revolving Fund with revenues collected from safari 
hunting fees (50%) and safari hunting concession fees (100%) in GMAs was set up 
at the NPWS headquarter (Mbewe, 2007). The other 50% of the trophy hunting fees 
were retained in central government revenues (ibid). The programme had sub-
authority committees in local communities with the traditional chiefs2 as 
chairpersons and senior headmen as committee members. These committees were 
for liaison purposes and implementation of community projects (Lubilo and Child, 
2010). However, this structure gave the traditional chiefs more power because of 
the control they had on the wildlife revenue resulting in little to no financial 
transparency and elite capture (Mbewe, 2007, Lubilo and Child, 2010). It did not 
encourage community participation but instead created distrust and outrage in the 
local communities (Child, 2004).   
The failures of the ADMADE program led to the transformation of the NPWS 
into a parastatal organisation called the Zambia Wildlife Authority (ZAWA) 
established under the Zambia Wildlife Act of 1998 ending the programme (Mbewe, 
2007). CRBs were registered under the ZAWA which saw the removal of traditional 
chiefs as chairpersons. This was because they are said to have played a role in the 
misappropriation of funds in the ADMADE and LIRDP (Child, 2004, Lubilo and 
Child, 2010). The chiefs were instead installed as patrons of the CRBs to offer 
advice of community development and wildlife resource management. This role 
                                            
2 In pre-colonial times the traditional Chiefs on behalf of the community had authority over wildlife 
and other natural resources in the Chiefdom. They would regulate the hunting and prevent illegal 
wildlife harvesting as well as punish wrongdoers. During the colonial times Chiefs lost this authority 
with the introduction of formal institutions. This led to increased illegal and commercial hunting of 
wild animals that prompted the CBNRM initiatives. The ADMADE and LIRDP were introduced to 
remedy the new problem by giving back power to the traditional authorities. Mbewe (2007) gives 
further details on the role of traditional leaders in CBNRM. 
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came with 5% of the community’s share of the hunting revenues and was meant to 
remove Chief from administrative roles while keeping them satisfied (ibid). 
2.2 Community Resource Boards structure 
The Community Resource Boards (CRBs) are made up of the traditional Chief 
(patron), up to ten board members chosen from the local community, and one 
council representative (Government of Zambia, 2015). The board employs a 
qualified secretariat to assist with the administration and is also responsible for 
employing village scouts to work with the Wildlife Police Officers employed by the 
State. The additional difference between the ADMADE and the CRB programme 
besides the removal of chiefs as chairpersons and the legal background was the 
formation of VAGs representing Household groups. Household groups (100-200 
households) form a 10-20 members VAG committee which is the basis of CRBs 
(Mbewe, 2007, Zambia Wildlife Authority, 2014).  
The ‘democratically’ elected VAG chairperson usually becomes the 
representative on the CRB. Elections are held every 3 years and according to 
election guidelines the VAG elections have to be announced throughout the GMA 
by the electoral committee at least two weeks before voting (Zambia Wildlife 
Authority, 2014). This should be done through public announcements, meetings and 
any other means as the norm in the traditional system. The eligibility of nominees 
is verified by election officials in liaison with the traditional Chief, local headmen, 
and headwomen through a ‘screening process’ (ibid).  
After votes are cast the candidate with the most votes becomes the VAG 
chairperson and the runner-up becomes the vice chairperson. The rest of the VAG 
positions such as secretary, treasurer, natural resource coordinator, community 
development coordinator, women’s coordinator, and ordinary members are filled by 
an in-house election (selection amongst themselves). Like-wise after the 
Chairpersons of the VAGs form the CRB, they have another in-house election to 
fill-up positions, this time including the position of the Chairperson (Zambia 
Wildlife Authority, 2014).  
Even though the CRB programme has a seemingly democratic approach, it 
apparently still is has a top-down management structure. For example, the Zambia 
Wildlife Authority used to collect 100% of the safari hunting and concession fees 
generated in the GMAs and later disburses 50% of the hunting fees to the CRB with 
5% going to the Traditional Chief (Mbewe, 2007, Lubilo and Child, 2010). The 
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community only gets 20% of the concession fees3 (ibid). In 2015 the functions of 
the ZAWA where transferred to the Ministry of Tourism and Arts under the 
Department of National Parks and Wildlife (DNPW) in accordance with the Zambia 
Wildlife Act No. 14 of 2015 because of its [ZAWA] bureaucratic dependence on 
revenues from GMAs, and failure to pay staff salaries (Ministry of Tourism and 
Arts, 2017). This move back to the government has still kept the CRB programme 
but now the revenues from wildlife resources are taken to central government 
revenues before being disbursed to local communities and not in totality. This 
indicates a partial devolution of fiscal power to the local governing bodies. 
Together, the government and local community protect the wildlife resources of 
the Game Management Areas and share the benefits that are derived from the natural 
resources (Mbewe, 2007, Lubilo and Child, 2010). Like many other CBNRM 
initiatives, the Zambian CRBs adopted a local democracy model where leaders are 
elected by local communities to act as their representatives in the management of 
wildlife resources. Even so, many scholars have criticized CBNRM citing poor 
representations of local communities, poor distribution of benefits to resources 
users, poor policies, weak institutions, and elite control and capture among others 
(Fabricius and Koch, 2004, Ribot, 2004, Child, 2004, Lubilo, 2018). I carried out 
my study in Mukungule Game Management Area which is part of the North 
Luangwa Ecosystem. I give a description of the study site in the next part.  
2.3 The study site 
This part describes the study site. I have kept the real name of the Game 
Management Area and Village Action Groups for this study but in order to maintain 
the anonymity of the respondents will not reveal the three (3) Village Action groups 
where the data was collected. The Mukungule GMA is located on the western 
boundary of the North Luangwa National Park in Mpika District of the Muchinga 
province (Zambia Wildlife Authority, 2004a). The GMA is named after the 
Mukungule Chiefdom that is found there. It is one of the buffer zones that surround 
the North Luangwa in addition to the Munyamadzi, and Musalangu GMAs (Zambia 
Wildlife Authority, 2004b).  
The Mukungule GMA has a tropical climate in a high rainfall ecological zone 
with an annual rainfall of approximately 900mm and above. It has three seasons 
which are the hot-wet season (November to April), cool-dry season (May to 
                                            
3 There currently a debate on whether local communities should continue to receive 20% of the 
hunting concession fees. The sharing of these fees emerged in 2004 in an agreement between the 
parastatal ZAWA and the community. Its was never legally formalised. After the transformation of 
ZAWA into the Government DNPW in 2015, the funds are being collected in the Central Treasury. In 
2017 the Ministry of Finance stopped the disbursement of the concession fees because it does not have 
a legal backing (Source: Norther Region CRB Association Meeting Report held 18th March 2019) 
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August), and hot-dry season (September to November) (Zambia Wildlife Authority, 
2004a). Local people are primarily crop famers producing Maize, sweet potatoes, 
finger millet and cassava among other crops. They sometimes have combined 
livelihood strategies such as livestock production (chickens, goats, pigs, rabbits, 
guinea fowls, doves, and ducks), vegetable gardens, natural resource utilization 
(fishing, mushroom picking, weaving, carving) and employment in the adjust park 
and safari camps (Zambia Wildlife Authority, 2004a). However, the livelihoods are 
threatened by wild animals that cause crop damage/loss and livestock predation. 
The local tribes of the Chiefdom are Bisa and Bemba who originated from the 
Luba tribe in the Democratic Republic of Congo formally Kola. There are 10 Village 
Action Groups which are Mukungule, Chipundu, Kaluba, Kashaita, Katibunga, 
Mwansabamba, Kakoko, Nkomba, Chishala, and Chobela (ibid). The Community 




3.0 CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK 
This chapter outlines the conceptual framework which I have used to understand 
how elites gain control over decision-making processes and under what conditions 
the elites are responsive to the public. In order to identify who the elites are in the 
CBNRM process, it is important to have a working definition of the term ‘elite’ to 
be able to recognise individuals or groups that fit the description. This has been done 
in (3.1). Section (3.2) further talks about elite control and capture to understand 
elites. I discuss Bourdieu’s concept of symbolic capital as the overlooked factor 
which elites use to get in to advantageous situations in (3.3). I then discuss the choice 
and recognition framework (Ribot et al., 2008, Ribot, 2013) to bring out its effects 
on local democracy and empowerment of elites (3.4). Lastly, in (3.5) I link the 
symbolic capital concept with the choice and recognition framework for the purpose 
of analysis in this study.  
3.1 Defining the elites 
In this section, I will explain the terms and aspects of the study in order to outline 
the scope of the study. I begin by first defining the ‘elite’ then move on to the 
resources they have access or control. Lastly, I define elite control and elite capture 
though this is discussed further in the next chapter.  
It is difficult to find a universally accepted definition for the term ‘elite’. There 
is no consensus on the definition and scholars on elites seldom define the term 
further adding to the disunity (Osei, 2018, Khan, 2012). Some articles have taken 
the Marxist way of thinking seeing elites as those who occupy dominant positions 
within social relations. Osei (2018) uses such an approach stating that elites are 
“persons who are able, by virtue of their strategic positions in powerful 
organisations and movements, to affect political outcomes regularly and 
substantially” (ibid, 2018:21). In contrast, the Weberian thinking focuses on class 
thinking of elites relative to the power and resources they have. In both thinkings, 
elites are seen as those with power and resources and the contrast comes on whether 
to look at the individual control over these resources or instead focus on structural 
relations that gives power to specific positions (Khan, 2012). This study focuses on 
the latter and so will define the ‘elite’ as an individual or group of individuals 
occupying a position/s that gives them access and control or possession of resources 
that advantages them (ibid).  ‘Local elites’ will, therefore, be defined as locally 
based individuals or groups the fit in the definition given above with 
disproportionate access and control to resource, that is, social, political, economic, 
cultural, and knowledge capital/power (Dasgupta and Beard, 2007).   
Understanding the resources that elites have access to or control is important to 
understand who the elites are, and how they gain control over decision making 
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processes. Resources as highlighted earlier include social, political, economic, 
cultural, and knowledge capital which must have convertible value (Inglis and 
Thorpe, 2012). This means that obtaining such capital is not enough, one must be 
able to use the capital and only then does the capital become valuable. This means 
that depending on the localities some capital will be more valuable and others will 
not because of the social processes of that area (Khan, 2012). Once the elites have 
resources or capital that has the transferable value they are able to gain or retain 
control of positions of power. This is can be defined as elite control.  
Elite control should not be confused with elite capture which is defined as “the 
process by which these individuals [elites] dominate and corrupt community-level 
planning and governance” (Dasgupta and Beard, 2007:230). This means that elites 
can have power without being corrupt but instead contribute their efforts towards 
community development and governance (ibid). Local elites who have strong social 
ties with community member both within and outside the village are less likely to 
benefit themselves at the expense of others but when the social ties are weak they 
face few sanctions and so are likely to capitalise on individual opportunities to 
capture any rewards for themselves or for those closest to them (Wilfahrt, 2018). 
The next part explores in detail the criticisms of CBNRM with a focus on elite 
capture and control. 
3.2 Elite control and capture 
Local democracy has positive effects on natural resource management because it is 
able to utilize local knowledge in its decision making processes and include multiple 
local voices (Ribot, 2004, Mulale et al., 2013). Implementation in the form of 
institutions and policy is an important factor in ensuring the positive outcome. For 
example, Saito-Jensen et al. (2010) recommend that safe guards be put in place to 
prevent further marginalization in communities because of existing social 
structures. The safe guards implied are institutions and policies that ensure 
minimum social standards, promote direct democracy, devolve power to other 
committee members besides the chairperson, and contact with equity-promoting 
third parties like NGOs (ibid). Failure to do so will not only frustrate the positive 
outcome but will result in negative effects such as elite capture. Elite capture occurs 
when individuals or organisations obtain benefits or advantages at the expense of 
others because of their dominant position (Ribot, 2004, Beard and Phakphian, 2009, 
Sindzingre, 2010, Saito-Jensen et al., 2010, Lubilo, 2018). As stated earlier, this 
must be differentiated from elite control where elites are seen to only dominate 
democratic processes without the capturing of resources.  
Elite control has been considered by some scholars to be an inevitable outcome 
for development and community wellbeing because developing countries have 
uneducated and culturally 'backward' communities (Mansuri and Rao, 2004, Khan, 
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2008). This according to them means that elite control as a necessary evil has a 
possible outcome where resources and benefits are distributed equitably among 
marginalized groups. However, this type of local democratic governance is not 
sustainable because it is likely that elite capture will occur depending on the 
benevolence or malevolence of the elites (Dasgupta and Beard, 2007, Osei, 2018). 
The goal of local governance is to promote accountability to local communities in 
order to strengthen all local actors as opposed to a few (Khanal, 2007).  
To describe developing countries as uneducated and culturally backwards, 
additionally, fails to acknowledge and appreciate that communities are governed by 
both formal and informal institutions. Informal institutions are flexible ‘rules’ based 
on an education acquired through experience within a society usually unwritten 
(Mulale et al., 2013). While formal institutions are less flexible written rules that 
aim to safe guard rights in a society (ibid). For example, in pre-colonial Zambia 
communities had a working system of traditions, beliefs, taboos, and regulations for 
managing natural resources governed by traditional leaders (Mbewe, 2007, Lubilo 
and Child 2010) whom under the formal institutions today would be regarded as 
elites.  The introduction of formal institutions to a society with informal institutions 
changes the social relationships and interactions that exist (Otto, 2013). Therefore, 
rather than call local communities uneducated or culturally backwards, it is better 
to learn and understand the informal institutional systems in place. 
The literature on elite capture reveals that communities are able to resist elites or 
make more responsive in two ways. Firstly, elite capture is not permanent as it can 
be remedied by the formalization of interaction calling for transparency and 
accountability to the local communities. In their study, Saito-Jensen et al. (2010) 
reveal that by formalizing interactions marginalised groups are able to form 
alliances with one another to resist oppression. In order to help marginalized groups 
the formalization of structures through strong institutions and policies enable them 
to justify demands of rights to equal decision-making powers and benefits from 
natural resources (Saito-Jensen et al., 2010). However, marginalized groups will 
only benefit from formalized structures if they come together as a unified front 
against the perceived elites as can be observed in the case-studies by Saito-Jensen 
et al. (2010) and Lund and Saito-Jensen (2013). Alternatively, solidarity may be 
used by elites to stay in positions of power through democratic means. For example, 
elites may use monetary or cultural capital to get support in electoral processes from 
groups. This can be done by promising to reward communities with benefits from 
resources if they elect them or may threaten to withhold resources if they do not 
elect them especially in impoverished communities (Conroy-Krutz, 2018).  
Secondly, communities resist or make elites more responsive by disobeying 
regulations, rules or by-laws enforced in their communities. Marginalized groups 
will do this to protest their exclusion from the benefits of natural resources as a 
result of elite capture (Lubilo, 2018). This type of action calls for re-organisation of 
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the management structures and even policies by either the elites themselves or other 
organisations such as the state or international NGOs to ensure that management 
goals are met. 
From the literature reviewed it can be observed that management of the natural 
resources is based on concepts which are inadequately socially informed and do not 
fully reflect the complex, diverse, specific nature of institutional formation (Cleaver, 
2002). There is more than one solution to the management of common property or 
common pool resources as can be observed from (Ostrom, 1990, Cleaver, 2002, 
Acheson, 2011). With reference to elite control and capture, this means that the 
management should be taken on a case by case basis taking caution as policies and 
formal institutions are implemented.  There is a need to have a perspective of 
decision making that integrates political, economic, and social contexts (Peterson, 
2010). 
3.3 Concept of capital 
According to Khan (2012) in order to study elites, it is important to study the control 
they have over resources as well as the value of those resources and distribution in 
the local communities. Using Bourdieu (1993)'s concept of symbolic capital, I 
identify how the elites have access to and control of resources. I did this with an 
interest to find out why certain individuals or groups occupy higher positions than 
others in a given field, in this case, the field of natural resource management in the 
game management area. Bourdieu describes three types of capital namely economic 
capital, social capital, and cultural capital (Inglis and Thorpe, 2012).  
Economic capital also described as physical capital is the monetary resource an 
individual or group have at their disposal (Ojha et al., 2009, Inglis and Thorpe, 
2012). Elites can use this capital to get in to positions of power where they are able 
to influence and control decisions in their favour. Additionally, they can use this 
capital to stay in positions of power. The CRB leadership is in-charge of community 
finances that come from wildlife hunting and tourism and so board members are in 
a position to utilise that money to acquire other resources or forms of capital. This 
can be through legitimate or corrupt means.  
Social capital is the social network of relations an individual or group has with 
other people (Inglis and Thorpe, 2012). Social capital is not only dependent on the 
number of people in the network but also the type of people (ibid). This means that 
in order to have high social capital an elite should have networks with the higher 
class even if they are few than have many connections to the lower-class people. 
These social ties facilitate information transfers and help to coordinate action or to 
produce consistent modes of action (Khan, 2012). Elites in CBNRM have the 
advantage of having information to get them in to positions of power such as 
election dates or CRB members’ requirements and duties. Furthermore, because of 
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shared understandings produced through common experiences with local 
communities are able to respond to community needs in order to stay in positions of 
power.  
Cultural capital is identified in three states, which are, the embodied state that is 
the socially recognised prestige attached to an individual or group’s practices; the 
objectified state which is the amount of knowledge about cultural issues like art, 
books or machines; and the institutionised state which is the academic qualification 
an individual or group possesses (Bourdieu, 1993, Ojha, 2008, Inglis and Thorpe, 
2012). Using culture as a resource the elite are able to form a stratified group 
marking themselves and are able to recognise one another through this classification 
enabling them to distribute opportunities to themselves and others on the basis of 
the display of chosen attributes (Khan, 2012). Through this, the elite are able to 
protect their status and draw boundaries to exclude others.   
The success or failure of the elite to gain control over decision making processes 
depends on whether the type of capital they have is relevant in the local community 
they are found in. This means that if the local community is capitalist then the elite 
with high economic capital will be successful and if the community instead is 
traditional then those with high social or cultural capital will be successful (Inglis 
and Thorpe, 2012). The local community must be able to recognise the capital 
possessed by the elite and they should attach value and prestige towards the 
recognised capital. The capital is then said to have symbolic value and it is then 
called symbolic capital (Ojha, 2008). Symbolic capital which is the resource of 
reputation has been defined as “a form of power that is not perceived as power but 
as legitimate demands for recognition, deference, obedience, or services” (Swarts 
1997:42). This means that symbolic capital is important for producing the elite in 
the local community. As a result of the symbolic capital, the elite are placed in 
positions of influence where they are able to accumulate more capital. This symbolic 
interaction allows those with high levels of relevant capital to stay in positions of 
power because those with low levels of capital do not see the need to challenge 
them. Therefore, the elite with high levels of relevant capital will have an advantage 
in decision-making. Elites continue to enjoy unchallenged privileges in accessing 
resources and power which they there use to dominate social interactions (Ojha et 
al., 2009). 
Recognition plays a major role in the production and reproduction of elites. Next, 
I introduce the choice and recognition framework to bring out how institutions and 
organisations play a central role in supporting elites and link the framework to the 
concept of capital. 
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3.4 Institutional Choice and recognition 
Community-based natural resources management has democratic decentralisation 
as its focal point where the Government transfers powers to actors and institutions 
to lower hierarchies in the system (Agrawal and Ribot, 1999). The transferring of 
power involves making actors autonomous by allowing them a field in which they 
are free to make their own decisions (Agrawal and Ribot, 1999, Larson and Ribot, 
2004). Governments and local departments that work with democratic community-
based organisations are choosing powers to transfer, the means by which to transfer 
the powers and the local individuals and institutions to receive the powers in these 
decentralisation efforts (Ribot, 2013).  
The support given to local authorities by government and international agencies 
can produce, privilege, and strengthen local elites in that they legitimise the elites 
by enforcing their behaviour, accountability relations, and beliefs on to the local 
community members (Ribot et al., 2008). This means that when a policy 
‘recognises’ an institution (formal or informal) or local authority it gives it the 
autonomy to act through the transfer of power. If that power is given to a democratic 
authority that is accountable and responsive, then there is a possibility of the local 
authority being representative of the community which promotes citizenship and 
creates a meaningful public domain. Alternatively, if it is given to an autocratic 
authority which is unaccountable and not responsive to the needs of the community 
then it will not be representative which will diminish citizenship and reduce the 
public domain (Ribot, 2013).  
The choice of community-based organisations and local authorities by 
Government and/or international agencies is a form of recognition or 
acknowledgement (Ribot et al., 2008). By way of choice, the government and 
international agencies are exercising agency and so have the responsibility for a 
decision that they make and in doing so must proceed with caution on the authorities 
they choose to recognise.  As was explained in the previous section individuals and 
organisations are seeking recognition for the capital they possess from others in the 
same field. This recognition in the sense of acknowledgement is part of the process 
of gaining and maintaining authority (Markell, 2000, Ribot, 2013). Choice and 
recognition strengthen the chosen local authorities [or elites] with resources or 
capitals hence creating and reproducing elites that shapes representation, citizenship 
and the public domain of local democracy (Ribot, 2013). 
3.4.1 Representation 
Because local institutions are formed on the basis of local democracy they have to 
be both accountable through the enabling of both positive and negative sanctions 
(Fischer, 2016) and responsive to the needs of the community. In order for these 
authorities to be responsive, there is a need for them to have discretionary power to 
transform needs and aspirations into policy and policy into practice (Ribot, 2003, 
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Pritchett and Woolcock, 2004). To be democratic, local institutions have to be 
representative, that is, they have to be accountable to the people and have to be 
empowered to respond (Ribot et al., 2008). Empowering other bodies like local 
NGOs, customary authorities and private corporations can de-legitimise elected 
local authorities (Ribot, 2013). This creates, reproduces and strengthens local elites 
by discouraging local participation from these structures. When local participation 
declines only the elites remain with the knowledge of how the local institutions 
operate while accumulating capitals.  
3.4.2 Citizenship 
Citizenship is seen to be a process where local community members are politically 
engaged and shape the fate of the polity in which they are involved (Isin and Turner, 
2002). It is also defined as a social process through which individuals and groups 
are engaged in claiming, expanding or losing rights (Ribot, 2013). Authorities that 
are democratic foster citizenship, while those that are autocratic are less inviting of 
engagement (Ribot et al., 2008). Where public resources are transferred to private 
bodies or autocratic leaders, citizenship is diminished. 
3.4.3 Public domain 
A ‘domain’ is comprised of resources and decisions held by a public authority 
(Ribot et al., 2008, Ribot, 2013). The public authority has the power to defend 
citizens’ rights and citizens are able to influence the public authority (Ibid).  This 
strengthens public belonging and identification as a citizen with the public 
authorities and with other citizens in the community. Without public powers, there 
is no public domain and no room for democracy. Empowering local elites reduced 
the size of the public domain creates classifications in the local community where a 
few individuals or group benefits at the expense of others. A public domain is 
necessary for representation and for the promotion of citizenship (Ribot, 2013).  
3.5 Linking the concept of capital with Institutional choice and 
recognition 
For this study, I link the concept of capital and the institutional choice and 
recognition framework to understand how elites gain control over decision making 
processes. More specifically I begin by looking at who the elites are in CBNRM and 
what their background is. A look at the CRB election guidelines produced by the 
Zambia Wildlife Authority now DNPW outlines how the process is done but does 
not reflect the actual process on the ground which has other influences at play such 
as the amount of symbolic capital local community members have and how that 
influences the decision of the community.  
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By understanding the elite and their background, I show that the guidelines fail 
to acknowledge this crucial detail of social processes that are important for 
supporting local democracy. The concept of capital allows us to see how elite power 
is produced and reproduced while the choice and recognition framework explores 
how policy interacts with the existing field of power relationship or symbolic 
interactions.  This is to say policy may be instrumental in supporting elites meaning 
that it is not just ‘recognition’ of an institution or local authority that influences the 
democratic outcome but that there should also be a consideration of the already 
existing domain of power or capitals that determines what happens after an 
institution is empowered.  
By using ‘choice and recognition’, I investigate who the organisations 
(government or international) operating in the local communities choose to work 
with and how this affects the capital distribution and accumulation thus affecting 
representation, citizenship and the public domain in the local authorities chosen. 
Additionally, with regards to the local authorities, I seek to understand how 
decisions are made on the boards to establish if they have been given discretionary 
powers to be responsive to the needs of the people as well as analyse the sanctions, 
positive or negative, that are in place to make leaders or elites accountable. By 
putting the concept of capital and the choice and recognition framework together, it 
has given me a foundation for studying how elite power is produced and exercised 





In this chapter, I critically discuss my research approach for this study and explain 
the data collection process. This includes how the study sites and respondents were 
selected. Additionally, I describe the methods and tools I used to collect empirical 
data in the field and how I analysed the data collected. 
4.1 Research design 
This study is based on a transformative worldview that seeks to develop an action 
agenda to address the social issue of elite empowerment, and domination in local 
authorities to influence change in the lives of the actors involved (Creswell, 2014). 
In this research, I attempt to improve the governance in community-based natural 
resource management and to improve the situation for marginalised individuals and 
groups by using the findings from this research to make suggestions for a policy 
brief.  
This research also draws upon the constructivist worldview to understand how 
elites gain control of decision-making processes through the interaction with the 
government, international NGOs and the local community (Creswell, 2014). For this 
reason, it was important to understand how community members make sense of their 
world and it socially constructed (Inglis and Thorpe, 2012, Creswell, 2014). 
Because this study is mainly transformative I decided to have both quantitative and 
qualitative methods in my research design. The qualitative methods were useful for 
data collection relating to life experiences of actors involved and for understanding 
how they frame their lifeworld (Silverman, 2015). The quantitative method 
(discussed in section 4.4) was used to improve the reliability and validity of the data 
collected in the qualitative study (Silverman, 2015, Bryman, 2012).  
4.2 Qualitative methods 
For the qualitative part of this study, I decided to do a case study (Yin, 2012) of 
Mukungule Game Management Area in order to have a ‘real-word’ understanding 
of the process of elite control and capture. The case study allowed me to collect 
detailed information for use in my evaluation (Creswell, 2014). I conducted seven 
weeks of data collection from February to March 2019. During this period, I had 
semi-structured interviews with Department of National Park and Wildlife staff, 
Community Resources Board and Village Action Group board members, Local 
community members and International NGO staff that are working in the area. In 
the interviews I used a question guide to ensure that I covered all the topics I felt 
were important for this study to meet my objective while at the same time allowing 
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me to have discussions with the respondents on topics they found to be important 
and insightful (Flick, 2006, Rubin and Rubin, 2005).  
Interviews with local community members including those found on the boards 
were done in Bemba the local language spoken in Mukungule. This made the 
interviews free-flowing and allowed me to have an in-depth exploration of the 
relevant topics especially those that were not included in my interview guide. It also 
put my interviewees as ease and relaxed to answer the question in a language they 
were comfortable in. In the interviews I had with staff from DNPW and the 
international NGOs I used a slightly different guide because I wanted to ensure that 
I recorded both their personal view on the topics of the study as well as 
organisational views. Each of the interviews was audio recorded, translated (where 
needed), and transcribed.  
In addition to the individual interviews, I had focus group discussions in the form 
of a participatory rural appraisal (PRA). The PRA tool I used was the Venn diagram 
on Institutions which shows institutions, organisations, groups and important 
individuals found in the local community and the villagers’ view of their importance 
in the community (Cavestro, 2003).  
Lastly, I complemented my data collection with observations of how community 
meetings are mobilised which allowed me to evaluate the process. Additionally, I 
was fortunate to attend the Northern Regional Community Resources Board 
Association quarterly meeting and General Management Plan (GMP) formulation 
for one of the Game Management Areas in the North Luangwa Ecosystem. While 
working in the North Luangwa I have attended such meetings before but coming 
back in the capacity of a researcher gave me a new perspective on the processes that 
occur. More important with my past experience it means these observations are not 
a snapshot of the conditions in this field (Flick, 2006). 
The next sections describe in detail the methods I use in the qualitative part of 
the study. I first describe how the sampling of respondents was done, then talk about 
the individual interviews and PRAs were conducted. Lastly, I describe my data 
analysis methods, and validity and ethical considerations.  
4.2.1 Sampling respondents 
Respondents for the quantitative survey included members of the Community 
Resources Board from four (4) Chiefdoms. For the qualitative part of the study, my 
first contact in the VAGs was with the Chairpersons. This made it easy for me 
organise interviews with other board members as well as other local community 
members. I soon realised that Chairpersons were only referring me to local 
community members that they were closely related or associated to and so I decided 
to change my approach by choosing households to interview based on interesting 
topics that came up and random selection through community interaction. However, 
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the action by the Chairpersons provides insight into how social relations are 
structured within the local community.  
4.2.2 Individual interviews 
I conducted one-on-one interviews beginning with DNPW staff. I had interviews 
with three (3) extension services staff (all male) for CBNRM because I felt this 
would give me the expert view of the area under study and help me with the selection 
of the VAGs to visit of which it did. Following the interview guide I prepared for 
staff, I conducted the interview in an informal set up to ensure the discussion was 
as free flowing as possible (Silverman 2015). The interviews helped me to 
reformulate the interview guide for local community member interviews. In the 
following weeks, I went to VAG 1, VAG 2, and VAG 3 and conducted the 
interviews in the same fashion.  
In VAG 1 I interviewed eight (8) respondents with three (3) women and five (5) 
men. In VAG 2 I had six (6) respondents who were all male. Lastly, in VAG 3, I 
interviewed four (4) women and one (1) man for a total of five (5) respondents. 
These respondents from the local community were leaders from the board, local 
community members, and some former board members. To conclude the individual 
interviews, I talked to staff (both male) from two (2) international NGOs that came 
up as prominent in the individual interviews and focus groups discussions I had in 
the local communities. This brought the total number of interviews to twenty four 
(24) with seven (7) women and seventeen (17) men. The interviews with staff both 
for DNPW and NGO lasted about 90 to 120 minutes while the interview with local 
community members averaged 60 mins.  
Table 1.Details of interview respondents 
Identity in 
text 
Organisation represented4 Interview date 
P1 DNPW 06/02/2019 
P2 DNPW 11/02/2019 
P3 DNPW 11/02/2019 
P4 VAG 1 13/02/2019 
P5 VAG 1 13/02/2019 
P6 VAG 1 14/02/2019 
P7 VAG 1 14/02/2019 
                                            
4 Role of participant in organisation has been withheld to keep anonymity of respondents. 
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P8 VAG 1  14/02/2019 
P9 VAG 1  15/02/2019 
P10 VAG 1  15/02/2019 
P11 VAG 1  15/02/2019 
P14 VAG 2  26/02/2019 
P15 VAG 2  26/02/2019 
P16 VAG 2  26/02/2019 
P17 VAG 2  27/02/2019 
P18 VAG 2  27/02/2019 
P19 VAG 2  27/02/2019 
P20 VAG 3 05/03/2019 
P21 VAG 3 05/03/2019 
P22 VAG 3  05/03/2019 
P23 VAG 3  06/03/2019 
P24 VAG 3  06/03/2019 
P25 NGO 18/03/2019 
P26 NGO  18/03/2019 
4.2.3 Participatory rural appraisal 
In each of the 3 VAGs, I conducted 2 focus group discussions which had men only 
and women only for each. This was done to ensure that women would speak as 
freely as possible as advised but staff members that work in the GMA. As 
highlighted earlier the focus groups were conducted using a participatory rural 
appraisal method (Cavestro, 2003).  
The PRA tool that I used was the Venn diagram on institutions (ibid). The 
objectives of the tool were to identify external and internal organisations, groups 
and important persons active in the community; identify who participates in local 
organisations and institutions; and to find out how the organisations and groups 
relate to each other (Cavestro, 2003). This helped to establish which groups and 
individuals hold symbolic capital in the community and how that affects the social 
capital in the community. 
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I facilitated the process and had Chrispin who works for one of the international 
NGOs that operates in the area and a former colleague took notes for me. I audio 
recorded the discussion to ensure nothing was missed during the note taking. The 
focus group took 1.5-2 hours. VAG 1 had six (6) men and nine (9) women in the 
PRA, VAG 2 had seven (7) women and seven (7) Men, and lastly, VAG 3 had seven 
(7) men and six (6) women. It was challenging to organise these focus group because 
people I spoke with were expecting a form of compensation for their time as is the 
practice when international NGOs hold focus groups which will be discussed further 
as part of the findings in later chapters. 
  
Figure 1. Conducting PRA in VAG2 (Photo: Gilbert Mwale) 
4.2.4 Data analysis 
I started my data analysis as I was doing my data collection as is suggested by 
Creswell (2014) and Silverman (2015). I would make notes after my interviews and 
highlighted what I felt to be the major points in the interview. This was useful for 
me to know the topics that I needed to further probe in the following interviews and 
it also helped me with coming up with the conceptual framework that I have outlined 
in Chapter 3. I transcribed my interviews into Evernote to ensure that I had a backup 
online and later copied the transcriptions in to Microsoft Office Word. I used 
thematic analysis using qualitative data software Atlas.ti version 7 to identify 
emerging patterns in relations to my research questions. The themes were used to 
structure my findings that are found in the following chapters. The data from the 
quantitative survey was used to support the emerging themes of this study by 
providing descriptive statistics.  
4.2.5 Validity and ethical consideration 
I ensured the validity of my study by employing different strategies (Shenton, 2004, 
Creswell, 2014).  I triangulated the data I got from employing the different methods 
in this study. This helped me to have a detailed and complete picture of the reality 
on the ground and to compare findings from different sources. Having worked in 
the area and going back as a researcher I was aware of my bias and ensured that it 
did not affect the data that I collected. I also made sure that the study was not tied 
23 
 
to the NGO I used to work for by informing/reminding the respondents that I was 
doing the study for my Masters degree. I ensured that the study did not put the 
participants in any risk of physical, psychological, social, economic, or legal harm 
(Creswell 2014) and made sure that all respondents understood that the interviews I 
was conducting were voluntary. In line with the transformative nature of the study, 
I made sure not to re/produce any elitism. However, to respect the culture I first had 
to ask for permission from the traditional chief to carry out the study in the Chiefdom 
which I felt is a form of legitimising authority. 
4.4 Quantitative methods 
For the qualitative part of the study, I did survey research to give a numeric 
description of the demographics and opinions (Creswell 2014) of CRB members in 
the North Luangwa Ecosystem. The data was collected over a period of four weeks 
between February and March 2019. The interviews were carried out with the 40 
CRB members from 4 Chiefdoms around the North Luangwa ecosystem. I prepared 
a structured interview (Fowler 2009) that was administered by local Community 
Liaison Assistants (CLAs) working for the international NGO that operates in the 
GMA.  
When I arrived in the field I had a chance to go through the interview questions 
with the local CLAs to make sure that they understood how to frame the questions 
during the interviews. It was not possible for me to administer the questionnaire 
because of the bad roads at the time due to rains and vast area that need to be 
covered. I used the data collected to identify who the elites are by summarizing in a 
table, characteristics of elites that emerge as shown in section 6.1.1 of the 
discussion. The table produced supports the results obtained from the qualitative 
part of the research. The data collected were categorised and analysed using the IBM 
SPSS statistics software.  
4.5 Selection of study sites 
I chose Mukungule Game Management Area as the location for my study because 
it is the most accessible during the rainy season when the data collection was done. 
This was convenient for me based on the resources and time available for this study. 
Having worked in the North Luangwa Ecosystem for 3 years helped me complete 
the study in the intended time because I had existing contact with relevant actors in 
my study site. My contacts included government staff, NGO staff, and contact 




Figure 2. Showing the state of the road going to Musalangu GMA vehicle got stuck while delivering 
questionnaire survey (Photo: Ephriam Lombe Mpika) 
I selected three study village action groups (VAGs) which I decided to keep 
anonymous in order to protect the identity of respondents. The VAGs were chosen 
in order of proximity to the North Luangwa National Park with VAG 1 being the 
closest to the National park and VAG 3 being the furthest in relation to this study. 
My assumption at the time of data collection was that VAGs closest to the National 
Park will have more competition for leadership of the VAG than areas further hence 
the choice of VAGs.  This was because during my interviews with respondents from 





5.0 EMPIRICAL FINDINGS 
In this chapter, I present my finding in the research.  In section 5.1 and 5.2, I focus 
on answering my first main question on how elites gain control over decision 
making processes. Section 5.1 answer the first sub-question on who the elite are and 
their background while in section 5.2 I answer the questions on who make the 
decisions and who do those decisions benefit. In section 5.3 I answer the last main 
question under which conditions elites are responsive to the public by looking at the 
public interaction with the elite. 
5.1 Who are the Elite? 
Looking at the definition of the elite as given in Chapter 3, they are defined as a 
person or group that occupies a position or role allowing them access and control or 
possession of the resources that advantages them.  The creation of the CRB and 
other CBO committees brought today’s elites in the CBNRM because it has given 
them control over the natural resources in the chiefdoms. As government staff 
highlighted.  
“This board [CRB] has the overall mandate of the whole chiefdom and it is 
the representation of the entire chiefdom. The function of this board is to 
collaborate with government in the sustainable management of natural 
resources as well as foster development in the chiefdom and safe guard 
human life from wildlife.” (P2: 20190211 DNPW)  
Additionally, in another interview with NGO staff, this was further supported that 
members on the CRB have been given the access and control over the resource. 
 “The CRB is the main structure and point of entry for us in these 
communities. If we need to work with anyone in the community, we talk to the 
CRB to recommend people in the community to work with” (P26 20190319 
NGO).  
This evidence shows that the transfer of control and access to natural resources have 
been placed in the hands of the CRB. The board or group can be call elite because 
any member that joins can accumulate the resource of reputation or symbolic 
capital. This elevates their position in the community whether they had high 
symbolic capital before or not. The board members not only have possession of the 
resources but are able to use those resources to their advantage as the following 
responses show.  
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“When someone becomes a CRB member there is a small allowance that 
comes in to your pocket when you have a meeting or assigned a duty to go in 
to town to buy some materials for a project. With that allowance, they use it 
to buy themselves beers or new clothes which makes them popular in the 
village. These are very poor areas so CRB members make themselves popular 
when they buy themselves nice clothes, nice food, and they establish a small 
shop where everyone goes to buy soap, cooking oils and other groceries, so 
that makes them popular” (P3 DNPW, 2019). 
The board members gain economic capital through the allowances that they get on 
the board. They are able to convert that capital into social capital and symbolic 
capital as the respondent put it, they become ‘popular’. The board members are also 
at an advantage because they are the first to receive benefits that come from wildlife 
resources such as community development projects and edible bush meat from legal 
hunting. As one VAG committee board member put it, 
“If there is a new project that comes like fish farming because I am part of 
the committee, I will be one of the first to have fish or a fish farm from this 
project. That is how we benefit. If there is distribution of seed in the village 
we are assured as VAG committee members to have a share.” (P16: 
20190226 VAG 2).  
“When there is sharing of meat, by being on the VAG committee you are 
assured of having a piece and the share is a bit different [bigger] from other 
community members.” (P7: 20190214 VAG 2) 
The board members also gain social capital through direct interaction with DNPW 
and NGO staff. This adds to their social network and makes them more likely to be 
the contact person for future government or NGO projects. They additionally build 
on institutionised cultural capital through capacity building programs aimed at 
community leaders.  
“They also benefit from the interaction that goes on between them, DNPW, 
FZS, and other organisations because of their positions, they also gain 
knowledge and capacity. In the community, being on the CRB is prestigious 
because they are regarded to be the leaders of the community.” (P26 
20190319 NGO).  
The choice to devolve some power to a few local community members through the 
CRB has led to the creation and promotions of local elites. As can be observed this 
has resulted in them having larger symbolic capital than they had before. This has 
put them in an advantageous position to keep on accumulating economic, social and 
27 
 
cultural capital. This is a process highlighting elite control. Elite capture depends on 
the behaviours, beliefs, and integrity of the individual members and was linked to 
specific positions. As noted during my interview with DNPW “Those that are in the 
top CRB, the CRB members. You find there are key positions in the CRB, for 
example, the Chairperson, Finance chairperson, resource chairperson, and CDC 
chairperson.” (P1: 20190206 DNPW 1:19).  These positions where highlighted to 
be prone to elite capture. This could be because they are considered to be the ‘top’ 
positions and so more prestige is attached to them. They are also the positions that 
handle the finances and material resources of the board. Therefore, if there is poor 
representation from the board, then it is likely to lead to elite capture.  
This shows us who the elites are in CBNRM and how they are produced and 
reproduced. To understand how they have become elites, I present next the findings 
on the history of the CRB, background of the elites and processes involving 
selection of the CRB leadership. 
5.1.1 History of the CRB 
I asked respondents to compare the management of natural resources 20-30 years 
ago with the way they are managed now. All the respondents from DNPW felt that 
the management system was better in the past. More specifically they compared the 
Luangwa Integrated Resources Development Project (LIRDP) which was 
implemented only in the South Luangwa ecosystem and the Administrative 
Management Design which was implement throughout the country. The LIRDP is 
described to have a bottom-up approach that gave the local community decision-
making authority and fiscal power. When it comes to promoting local democracy, 
these are essential elements. As can be seen from the choice and recognition 
framework highlighted in the conceptual framework, this is because discretionary 
power devolution improves representation my promoting accountability and 
responsiveness of leaders. Respondents said that in the LIRDP the local community 
members respected the system and felt ownership of their natural resources so much 
that it helped reduce the illegal hunting (poaching) problem. 
The benefit of the LIRDP 
“Learning from past experience, my observation is that previously the 
management system was better than it is now. 20-30 years ago, like the area 
where I’m coming from (South Luangwa ecosystem, Malama Chiefdom), 
most of the responsibilities were given at the community level and VAG level. 
Decisions were made at VAG level, even the decision to employ the village 
scouts (which has now been legalised) was decided by the communities. The 
community decided [that] ‘we need to have village scouts [and decided] who 
(village scouts) will work with the government scouts (wildlife police 
officers)’. Even [when it came to] allocating money to say ‘we want our 
28 
 
scouts to be paid so much from the money given to the VAG’ the communities 
were able to decide. They also decided how much [of the money] each 
household got.  
Those days in the Lupande GMA they were given 80% of the hunting 
revenue which was shared at VAG level in all the VAGs. VAGs were making 
decisions to say we (the community) are going to employ one or two people 
and we are going to allocate so much money towards this person (employees 
and households). So, for me that was a plus because the people could respect 
that because. (P1: 20190206 DNPW) 
According to this narrative, the LIDRP was working not only because it 
devolved discretionary power to everybody in the local community but because 
there was a ‘fair’ distribution of capital in the community. Locals received 
money from the natural resources at the household level and they decided who 
to employ from the community. This, however, does not account for the informal 
institutions that were and are present in the areas such as culture, tradition 
leadership influence, and gender relations. Elites would have still been present 
but because decisions were made publicly and transparently, the leadership looks 
to be representative of the local community. This made it difficult for elite 
capture to occur.  
In contrast, the ADMADE programme is described as being top-down with 
the traditional chief being the deciding authority through the structure’s sub-
authorities. This programme legitimised the informal institution of traditional 
leadership by recognising their authority and devolving power to them. This 
made the traditional chief even more powerful and led to misappropriation of 
money from natural resources intended for community development and natural 
resources management. Probably because the legitimisation of the Chiefs’ 
authority and the respect they hold through informal institutions or culture made 
it difficult to prosecute them. They accumulated large amounts of capital making 
them seem as though they were entitled to the resource by those that had less 
capital as the concept of capital dictates.  
Legitimising traditional leadership 
“The sub-authorities were being managed by the traditional chiefs and some 
indunas. Very few people who were not part of the traditional leadership were 
part of the committees.  Only very few like a nephew who was trusted5 by the 
chief were the ones who were in the sub-authorities.  The chief was the 
                                            
5 Trusted in this context refers to someone who is not likely to harm the chief to attain power. 
Though most chiefdoms in Zambia are patriarchal, the chieftaincy works on a matrilineal inheritance 
system. This means that nephews (nieces in some Chiefdoms) are looked at with suspicion when it 
comes to power relations. 
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chairperson. The sub-authorities were in place from 1985 up to the year 
1998.” 
 “In 1999 we decided to change from sub-authorities to CRBs. This was 
because we noticed some problems, that was, the chiefs were so powerful 
during the sub-authority management. They were able to make decisions on 
their own without consulting anyone. Yes, there were a lot of projects done 
under this programme but we, later on, started observing some 
misappropriation of funds because the chief was the final decision maker. 
When a chief makes a decision here in Zambia nobody can oppose it. If he 
says, ‘I want ZWM50, 000 (USD3, 814)6 now!’ Nobody would ask what it is 
for. Apart from that, [when making] decisions for conservation (natural 
resources in the Chiefdom), nobody else apart from the chief could make a 
decision. For example, when making decisions to build a wildlife camp or 
school (suggested by DNPW or community) the chief would oppose because 
the chiefs were too powerful.” (P3: 20190211 DNPW)  
The narrative suggests that though the programme recorded some successes it could 
not be continued because of elite capture. Not only that, DNPW could not control 
the Chiefs to implement programmes that they wanted such as the building of 
wildlife camps. The Chiefs were more concerned with preserving their power and 
authority as well as their capital from both their heirs and DNPW. They only ‘trust’ 
people from their social network to take up management positions and probably 
benefit from the natural resources.  
It appears DNPW also do not want to lose control over the management of 
natural resources and that is why the ADMADE programme was done away with. 
The CRB initiative was then adopted. The ADMADE is described to be the one that 
initiated community-based natural resource management in Zambia even though the 
LIRDP seemed to be the better of the two. I imagine adopting LIRDP meant less 
control for the Government with regards to natural resource.  
“After that transformation and revision of the laws then the CRB was born 
under the Wildlife act no. 12 of 1998. So because of that change, there were 
some few changes which arose because once the CRB was formed most of the 
rights and powers were given to the CRB and not the VAG.” (P1: 20190206 
DNPW 1:9) 
 The rights and powers were devolved to 10 board members who would be easier 
to control than a whole community. This, however, also meant that the authority and 
power the Chief held before was transferred to the 10 elites.  
                                            
6 Exchange rate used for Jun 2019 1 USD = 13.11 ZMW. 
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5.1.2 Background of the leaders 
I was also able to get the background narrative of former and current VAG 
chairpersons in VAG 1 and 2. This was to understand the type of people in 
leadership positions that are or become elites. The first narrative was taken from the 
VAG 1 chairperson he describes the activities he takes part in within the community. 
These activities have allowed him to gain economic, social and cultural capital in 
the community that eventually lead him to take up other leadership positions on the 
CRB and new development projects introduced by NGOs.  
Utilising social and cultural capital 
“In the community, I have a position as the VAG chairperson. I am also found 
in our church committee at the district level [where] I am the vice secretary 
of the Music department and at church (village level), I am the Music 
director. 
I work for a safari camp [in the Chiefdom], I got my part-time job through 
a friend. This friend found me a job looking after the children of a tourist 
from the UK who came to the camp in our [National] park. I looked after the 
children for 2 months. When the white person saw that I worked well in these 
2 months, he introduced me to the owner of the camp where he was staying. 
That’s how I was offered the job as a camp attendant for the same place. 
 In the last election what happened was that even I wasn't aware that there 
would be elections in our VAG. I was only told by some people in the 
community that some vehicles that are parked at the school are here to 
dissolve the VAG committee in readiness for elections. They urged me to go 
there immediately because after the dissolution there will be nominations 
meaning that those people who will be found there are the ones who will be 
nominated to stand for elections. So that’s how I found myself there and was 
able to get a nomination form for filing in. Before this, I had no information 
about the nomination day.  
With regards to other activities I am involved in the community, there is a 
new [community development] project that we are working on together with 
an NGO7. I am part of the committee that was formed to lead this process. 
If you want people to vote for you, number one, people have to see honesty 
in you. Number 2, you are supposed to tell people what you will come to do 
once you been put in the VAG position. People will then judge if the person 
standing can work for them as a leader or not. So, if they see that the person 
can be a good leader, a great number of people get up and make sure that 
person becomes their leader in the VAG. People also look at the popularity 
of the person in addition to the honesty of the person in the village.” (P4: 
                                            
7 Name of the NGO has been removed to maintain anonymity of the respondent. 
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20190213 VAG 1)   
From experience, he understands what people look for in a leader and works to 
keep that reputation for himself. By being a leader in the church8 and working at a 
safari camp he builds a reputation for himself as someone that people can relate to 
while proving his experience in natural resource management. 
In the next narrative, I interviewed a former VAG committee member for VAG 
1 when the CRB for Mukungule Chiefdom was formed. In this narrative, he 
describes his current role in the community after the committee role. He has used 
the symbolic capital he made on the board to remain an elite in the community by 
working and serving on different committees afterwards.  
Democracy in practice  
“Currently, I am the leader of the Community forestry committee as well as 
the Chairperson of the beekeeping committee. I am still working with the 
community of Mukungule and they always like me to be a leader because I 
support all the natural resources of Mukungule even the Wildlife [animals]9. 
I don’t want anyone to destroy the animals because it provides money for us 
in this community through tourism and other support groups like COCOBA10. 
I am also a sanitation leader at the clinic. We were trained by an NGO 
11to educate the community on how to keep their environment clean which 
includes having a pit latrine, rubbish pits, and thatched bathing areas. I am 
also a member of the Rural Health Centre as a sanitation worker. For me to 
join this sanitation committee there was a general meeting held in the 
community then they picked people per village to form a group of 20.  Then 
we were trained, the training took 5 days. The people who made the selections 
are the people from the clinic who know which people are active in the 
community those that can work without being pushed. Because this is 
voluntary work they need to choose a person who they believe can help the 
community. They also look at how someone approaches people in their homes 
and someone with people skills.  
                                            
8 Zambia was declared a Christian nation by the second Republican President Fredrick Chiluba in 
the 90s and so being religious is very important in the local communities. Local community members 
also believe in witchcraft and shun it, therefore, being associated with the church means you distance 
yourself from the act. 
9 Wild animals have lost favour in the community because of HAC hence the need to stress that he 
still supports them. 
10 These are microfinance groups introduced in the North Luangwa ecosystem by Frankfurt 
Zoological Society (FZS) aimed at promoting conservation of natural resource through savings and 
loan distribution. 
11 This is an International NGO working in the Chiefdom to promote community development 




For the beekeeping committee, 20 people were picked here from this VAG 
whom another NGO12 was supposed to give beehives. We went through 
training to know how to keep bees and produce honey. After all the training, 
we were told that we could now form a committee from the group that we 
formed. We did this through a secret ballot process were some people would 
be suggested for a position then their names would be written on a small piece 
of paper as a vote. The one with the greatest number of votes would be the 
chairperson that’s how I ended up winning. Three of us stood on the 
Chairperson position.” (P5: 20190213 VAG 1)  
From this narrative, we can see how the choice of the NGOs to look for the ‘active’ 
members of society has led to this person maintaining his elite position in society. 
The people with large symbolic capital is likely the ones to be picked for these NGO 
community development projects leaving behind those with lower capital. Granted 
the selection is done at community meetings for transparency but it neglects the 
symbolic interactions happening in the community including the informal 
institutions of these local communities.  
Interestingly, the symbolic capital or reputation can also be used for driving 
‘political’ change. I found out from him that he was the one that led a campaign 
around the community to remove the previous VAG chairperson because he felt the 
Chairperson had over stayed on the position and someone new was needed. 
 
 “These leaders on the CRB have a system to stay in power. What they do is 
that when the time for elections comes and information is given to them from 
FZS and DNPW offices, they wait until there is one week left to the election 
before they can spread the information to the rest of the community members. 
Therefore, those who wanted to stand for elections on the CRB and want to 
do campaigns are unable to do so because the time is too short. So here in 
this VAG, we took action that I led to a campaign in the community to ensure 
that we have a new and young chairperson for the VAG. We campaigned all 
around the VAG and that’s how we removed the previous chairperson. We 
were able to do this because we understood the methods board members use 
to stay in power but in other areas where people don’t know they ended up 
electing the same people who are now on the CRB.” (P5: 20190213 VAG 1) 
Though it is true that the previous VAG chairperson had stayed in his position 
for a long time (roughly 12 years), the true motives behind this campaign are 
debateable. One would wonder why this change did not come earlier. During our 
discussion, I got an impression that this respondent and the previous chairperson 
                                            
12 Name of NGO has been withheld to maintain anonymity. 
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where not on good terms. He introduced himself as the first VAG chairperson 
when in fact he was not. The first VAG chairperson was the one that was recently 
removed. It is possible that he used his capital and influence to remove his rival 
from power. 
After this interview, I decided to make a follow up with the previous VAG 
Chairperson to get his side of the story. Like the other elites, he too had built up 
symbolic capital using his economic, social and cultural capital. He suggested that 
the only reason he lost the last election was that staff from DNPW wanted him off 
as chairperson. This was contrary to the previous narrative which suggested he was 
removed after losing his popularity. He instead told me that DNPW staff organised 
a vehicle to ferry DNPW game rangers to the voting stations, just so they could vote 
to remove him. According to him, he felt they [DNPW] were not happy that he was 
the voice of the people in demanding for what the people wanted especially in 
animal-crop damage mitigation and also because DNPW could not control him. He 
strongly felt that he was still the people’s favourite in the community.  
The people or Government’s choice? 
“When I returned [from working outside of the village for 6 years], I was 
chosen as the VAG chairperson …until when I stopped in 2018. I was chosen 
as VAG chairperson about 2003. Before I was also the P.T.A chairperson for 
3 years, I also worked for 3 years at the clinic with the Neighbourhood Health 
Committee. At the same time, I work at the Chief's palace to help lead groups 
in the community. When the Chief would go educate and check on people in 
the Chiefdom he would take me along with him as an advisor.  In the village 
I am not the Headman but was put as the vice. I am second to the Headman. 
We were about 13 the people who stood in the last election. The 
competition wasn't even strong because people didn't pay attention to these 
other candidates. Everybody in the community wanted me as Chairperson 
then this was just changed by the scouts. The scouts were the only ones who 
wanted the other person. In the end, there was only a difference of 8 votes 
between the winner and myself. There were too many scouts even those that 
were supposed to be on duty were pulled out to come and vote. It was like 
having an election for a member of parliament.  
I didn't go ahead with the petition because I was also scared that these 
scouts may hold a grudge on me and try to frame me by hiding elephant tusks 
in my house so that they can remove me from power. So I just let it be as it is, 
I know that I will come and lead again because people will come and vote for 
me again because they still want me. So I will let this person work so that 
people can see how he will mess up.” (P11: 20190215 VAG 1). 
From this narrative, the respondent was suggesting that he lost only because he 
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was not was the favourite for the DNPW game scouts. If this is true, then it suggests 
that elites are not only responsive to local community members but to organisations, 
the traditional leadership and other stakeholders in the Chiefdom. To be able to 
maintain their positions elites would have to ensure that they do not lose favour from 
all these actors. 
 From the three narratives, it is evident that popularity and social capital plays a 
major role in getting into these positions in the VAG committee and even on the 
CRB. In the previous narrative, the respondent highlighted his closeness to the Chief 
which possibly influenced his being CRB and VAG committee. In the next 
narrative, the respondent narrates how he was recalled by the traditional Chief to 
serve on the CRB. Like in all the other narratives, the VAG chairperson is ‘active’ 
in the community and has high symbolic capital.  
The importance of capital in elections 
“In the community am the VAG Chairperson. I am also the Chairperson of 
the Horticulture group that was recently formed by an NGO13 as a community 
development project. I can say I am active in the community because of the 
response I get from people. A lot of the times people want me to take up 
leadership positions, but I just have to decline the offers. Just recently there 
were elections at the Parent-Teacher Association and they wanted me to be 
the Chairperson. I had to refuse because I saw that I already hold too many 
leadership positions and if I keep accepting these offers it might affect the 
way I work. People want honesty in their leaders.  When they see honesty in 
things that you do or work on then they feel that even in groups that come up 
you can be a good leader.  
The CRB was formed in 2004 but for us to start functioning fully we started 
in 2008. From 2004 it was just the formation and setting up of documents 
then in 2008 that when we start receiving funding from Chilanga (DNPW 
head office). I joined the CRB in 2004 I was part of the interim committee. I 
served for 2 terms then on the 3rd term, the late extension officer from DNPW 
told people in the community that I wasn't allowed to stand because you can't 
serve on the board for 3 terms. People were not happy with this decision. So 
a new CRB was put in but they didn’t work so well that the Chief called me 
to his palace and asked me to recontest in the next elections. He called me 
together with the Secretary who was equally not allowed to stand previously 
because of 'no third term'. That's how we stood again in the following election 
and we both managed to win in our VAGs and I was put back on the CRB. 
(P15: 20190215 VAG 2) 
                                            
13 The name of the NGO has been withheld to maintain anonymity of the respondent. 
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In this narrative, the respondent highlights how he manages to keep his social, 
cultural capital and reputation in the village. Additionally, he reminds us that the 
Chief still has influence and authority over the formal institution like the CRB in 
the Chiefdom. This authority comes from culture and tradition, the informal 
institutions. In the same narrative, the respondent further talks about the CRB 
election process and how people in the community are abusing the campaign process 
to buy voters. He sees this as one of the reasons women don’t stand and why some 
people are left out in the process. From it, we learn the CRB had never had a female 
member on the CRB until the last election. This means that in all the 10 VAGs this 
was the first woman to be elected chairperson. 
“People are problematic, during the campaign some candidates were buying 
people beer, and others bought fish and started distributing and so on… Some 
people think that being on the CRB you get a salary and so do whatever it 
takes to get on the CRB. Some people even differ and create enmity amongst 
themselves. Some even today after elections are done they still don't speak to 
each other. Then sometimes you will find that women want to stand as well 
but they look down on themselves thinking they won't manage to do the 
campaign. So, you find a lot of people are left out because of this process 
because people feel that you need to have money [to win votes]. People these 
days do not just want to vote for someone who hasn't given them something 
[bribe].  
I think the election process would have been better if they removed the 
campaign period. VAG committee members should be elected at a community 
general meeting when everybody is present. The votes can still be secret by 
giving candidates a number or symbol right at the meeting then allowing 
people to choose right there and then. I think women would be willing to stand 
then because right now we only have one woman on the CRB. I don't even 
know what happened in her VAG for her to win. It’s a very big success for 
Mukungule CRB because this is the first time a woman has been on the CRB. 
 I think the number of women on these boards (VAG committees) is low 
because some women need to be encouraged or motivated to stand. Then 
others are scared of their husbands because these positions require a lot of 
traveling and some husbands do not feel comfortable with the wives traveling 
a lot, especially with other men. As a result, a lot of women are scared. You 
find that most of the time the women found on the VAG committees are women 
who are not married. Sometimes even people in the community think that 
women cannot lead. So, women are brought down and discouraged. Men are 
stubborn even when they are told by the community that they won't make it 
they still argue and stand.” (P15: 20190215 VAG 2 15:21) 
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The respondent in this narrative sees the campaign period as the source of elite 
capture. Those elites in the community with large economic capital use that capital 
to get into positions of power because they think they will earn a salary for it. He 
thinks by instead choosing leader publicly at community meetings this would help 
to solve the elite capture problem. Once again though, this solution only puts the 
community at the mercy of different types of elites. The elites found in the informal 
institutions. This is evident when he highlights that married women are not allowed 
to stand by their husbands in the CRB election.  
Next, I will look at how the elections are carried out to explore what local 
communities look for in their leaders and understand further why some people are 
left out.  
5.1.3 Selection of the elite 
On this section, I get from my respondents the local perspective of the election 
process, what they feel the local community wants from the people they choose and 
how they perceive women’s participation. Some of the respondents described the 
process as ‘democratic’ with the chairperson of the VAG being the first one to 
receive the date of nomination and the nomination forms.  
The nominations forms are supposed to be filled by anyone who wants to stand 
for elections to be the chairperson of the VAG. “The nominations date is announced 
by the [sitting] Chairperson and he is the one who distributes application forms. 
The chairperson tells the applicants the people from town (DNPW and FZS) will 
come and interview all those that have applied.” (P18: 20190227 VAG2 18:7) 
According to the respondents the elections are carried out by the DNPW and FZS 
who ensure that the screening process is done to ensure only qualified14 candidates 
stand. 
 Additionally, “When someone applies to stand the application has to be taken 
to the Chief in Mukungule village for approval then that person can stand.” (P17: 
20190227 VAG2 17:10) The nomination forms are sent to the chief for approval 
and he decides who should stand and who should not. This legitimisation of 
traditional leadership is undemocratic and diminished citizenship. There is a threat 
of locals not seeing the CRB as a legitimate authority and so will mostly likely not 
be engaged in its operations. To make things worse, “The Chief sometimes uses the 
CRB election guidelines to screen nominees but will sometimes pick a candidate 
because they are popular or because the chief likes that candidate even if they don’t 
have the qualifications. If you try to oppose the chief strongly he will say ‘since you 
don’t want to hear what I am telling you, go and form a CRB in your [own] area 
(chiefdom)’.” (P3: 20190211 DNPW 3:16) Meaning that either things are done the 
                                            
14 The qualifications of nominees are listed in the CRB election guidelines that were reviewed and 
passed in 2013 by the Zambia Wildlife Authority now DNPW. They state one must be a local resident; 
non-partisan; not a civil servant; aged 25yrs and above, be Zambian and have no criminal record. 
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Chief’s way or there will be no CRB for the Chiefdom. This is characteristic of an 
autocratic system and elite capture is likely to occur. As in the ADMADE 
programme the Chief is likely to install his in-circle on the board. The evidence so 
far suggests this is not far from the truth. 
As observed so far, the nomination process is already undemocratic. Once the 
nominations are done there is a campaign period and then elections are carried out. 
In the election, however, community members only get to vote for the VAG 
chairperson. 
“There are elections held in the community so that people can choose who 
they want to be leaders of the VAG. People take the whole day to cast their 
vote then the person that get the most votes in the VAG elections becomes the 
Chairperson of that VAG. Then the person who comes second and the 
remaining people sit down with the new chairperson to have in-house 
elections to fill the other positions that are on the VAG board.” (P4: 
20190213 VAG1 4:11)  
The rest of the positions in the VAG committee are shared by the newly elected 
committee. The process is the same on the CRB. The ‘newly’ elected VAG 
Chairpersons have an in-house election to decide who will be Chairperson of the 
CRB, Secretary, Women’s Affairs Chairperson, Community Development 
Chairperson, Resources Management Chairperson, and the vice to all the positions. 
This means the local community does not get to decide what happens on the CRB. 
Some respondents felt this process was unfair. 
“To select CRB members there is first a general meeting then people are 
selected at VAG level. Those 10 people selected to the CRB then have an in-
house election to give themselves positions. The selection of CRB members’ 
position is not ok but the selection of VAG members is fine. Those 10 people 
on the CRB should have been given positions by the community and not an 
in-house election. The way it is means that, since they are used to being on 
the CRB they always give themselves the same positions.” (P5: 20190213 
VAG1 5:11) 
The concern from this respondent was that if someone keeps getting re-elected in 
their VAG committee then that person is likely to hold the same position on the 
CRB each time. This was echoed by respondent P26 who is an NGO staff. They are 
right to be concerned because the election guideline has made it easy for elites to 
control these positions. The whole process diminishes the public domain and 
reduces citizenship. While elites are free to keep on accumulating capital. 
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5.1.4 Leadership qualities 
When I asked my respondents about what they think the community looks for in 
their leaders I got the following results. On the one hand, some respondents felt that 
money did not play a huge factor when it comes to winning the election. They felt 
that a person in the community must have good behaviour and relations with other 
community members if they want to be elected than have money and keep bad 
relations with people. Yet so far, the evidence suggests that money is key in 
campaigns and winning elections.  
“If you want to stand for elections on the VAG you are not supposed to be a 
poacher, you are supposed to be a person who is willing to work for the 
community. You are supposed to be a good person who can work for the 
people. There is no other thing like having lots of money that is required only 
those qualities I have mentioned which are having good behaviour in the 
community.” (P6: 20190214 VAG1 6:7) 
“The way it is when you stand, even though I've never stood I have witnessed 
this, the way you relate to people and what you share with them is important 
and will determine the number of votes that you will get.  Money isn't a big 
factor. You can find someone has a lot of money in the community but has 
poor contact with people this person will not be popular but there are those 
people who don't have money but maintain a good relationship with people 
then this person will be better off. There are even people who have money but 
will never help out anyone because they don't have a heart for the people but 
you might go to someone without money they may be able to give you valuable 
advice that can even be better than money.” (P10: 20190215 VAG1 10:12) 
“A lot of the times people look at the behaviour of a person. They know that 
this person is like this and can work in this manner. That’s why even though 
some people may have money to campaign some people wouldn't vote for 
them because of their bad behaviour. Some may have no money but because 
they have a good name in the community people will vote for them.” (P20: 
20190305 VAG3 20:8) 
People in the community want good leaders. These leaders are defined as humble, 
respectful (even when drunk), social, law abiding, and not suspected of witchcraft 
(P26: 20190319 NGO 26:24). Evidently, elites respond to the leadership needs of 
the community to keep enjoying their positions. However, some may also use 
monetary capital to gain social capital by buying beer and food material as campaign 
materials during elections. It could be said that local community members overlook 
these qualities once a bad leader ‘flashes money’. This proves the lack of citizenship 
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and belonging on the part of the community. They feel the CRB has nothing to offer 
them and the only way to benefit is to accept the bribes from the elites. 
 “Candidates move around the villages with their campaigns so that they can 
get votes just like it is in the presidential elections. Because of these 
campaigns, you can even find that people don't vote for someone who is 
honest but because someone is buying beer or stuff then they vote for him 
even if there is nothing that he can do for the community.” (P24: 20190305 
VAG3 9:9)  
They say this is problematic because it leads to people voting for people with ‘no 
vision’ to lead. Part of the problem is that there are no regulations that govern the 
election campaigns and so candidates are left to use any means possible to win votes. 
What is even more worrying is that they liken this sort of campaigning to a 
presidential election. If there is truth to this then Zambian democracy needs to be 
re-organised.  
Candidates that have no money to use during the campaign lose hope and 
sometimes end up dropping out of the race. “We were 10 people who wanted to 
stand for elections but after we saw that our friends had money to campaign and we 
didn’t, we dropped out so they remained 7 people who actually stood. 3 women and 
4 men. These are the people who made serious campaigns.” (P24: 20190305 VAG3 
24:6) This was what a VAG committee member from VAG3 told me. After 
dropping out, she ended being selected by the committee that won the election 
because they needed to fill up the positions in the committee to be 10. 
5.1.5 Race for the chairperson position 
The VAG elections are centred on the chairperson position and community 
members have taken notice of this. “Some gain interest because they see the benefit 
the chairperson enjoys and so would like that position.” (P1: 20190206 DNPW 
1:26) Some people only want to join the VAG committee to be the chairperson if 
they don’t make it then there is no point of being on the VAG committee as the case 
given in the narrative of leaders’ background.  “People want the chairperson 
position because this is the top most leadership position. They want to be in-charge 
of everybody, and control other board members and also gain popularity in the 
community. Respect is given mostly to the Chairperson, not any other position that's 
why a lot of people want to have this position.” (P11: 20190215 VAG1 11:22) The 
chairperson position has become prestigious. “The CRB chairperson position is very 
critical and so it must be someone who has done grade 12 in terms of education, he 
knows how to read, he knows how to speak English.” (P3: 20190211 DNPW 3:24) 
The educational requirement is not mentioned in the CRB guidelines as a necessary 
qualification for candidates. Yet because this is considered a ‘critical position’ by 
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the authority in-charge of the screening process during elections (DNPW), it is seen 
as a symbol of someone who is educated by the community. As a result, those 
without education (institutionised cultural capital) are blocked from contesting the 
Chairperson position 
5.1.6 Women Participation 
It is evident in the findings that women’s participation in the CRB and VAG 
committees is low. As the VAG2 chairperson pointed out, women are scared to 
stand because their husbands don’t allow them and because they lack the confidence 
and resources to stand and campaign. “Women, not all of them but most of them, 
think they cannot manage to convince people to vote for them as chairperson of the 
VAG. This discourages them from standing for elections. If they do stand for 
elections, they do not manage to move around the community to tell them (people) 
to vote for them [during campaigns].” (P4: 20190213 VAG1 4:19) This is another 
example where overpromotion of the VAG Chairperson positions has led some in 
the community to feel the position is reserved for ‘special’ people. Women do stand 
but not for the top seat usually. It could be that the lack of relevant capital has 
prompted women to leave the top position for the men. It is therefore clear that even 
when women do manage to get on the CRB or VAG they do not actively participate 
in the natural resource management and governance processes.  
“Very few women will volunteer to be on the committees. Even when they are 
part of the board they will not lobby to get higher positions in the CRB. 
Women have an inferiority complex, they feel higher positions should be left 
for men. Some women are stopped from joining the committees by their 
husbands. Such demoralises women from participation. Women who are 
more exposed and have experience are more likely to disagree with their 
husband on participation.  Some women who end up on the VAG/CRB will 
limit their participation to menial jobs such as drawing water and cooking 
food for other committee members instead of actively participating in board 
meetings. Men make all the decisions.” (P1: 20190206 DNPW 1:20) 
Exposure and experience play a vital role in ensuring women’s participation in 
the VAG and CRB. This could be that women are likely to have better access to 
information relating to elections and board activities. It could also be that women 
through exposure become less dependent on their husband in this patriarchal system 
and have better bargaining power.  
The women respondents that I interviewed believe that women want to stand and 
take up leadership positions. They do however feel that they are blocked by the 
community or system from doing so. One way that this is done is by withholding 
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information from those that have the aspirations to stand. One of my respondents in 
VAG 1 noted.  
“I only know one woman on the VAG committee. She was determined to be 
on the VAG and was ready to stand, she was able to get the nomination 
information on time and registered her name. I think if we all heard that 
information on time we would have considered standing too but the 
information did not reach us in time we found that they had already 
nominated.  A lot of women want to stand but we are blocked because they 
think that we can't lead. We know we can lead so long as we are given the 
knowledge just like Ingonge Wina15 our female vice president. She is an 
example to prove that women can lead as well when given the chance.” (P9: 
20190215 VAG1 9:8)  
Poor information distribution is seen here to be one of the factors that lead to 
poor women participation. Earlier it was pointed out that the VAG chairperson 
is one place in charge of informing the VAG of the upcoming elections. It is 
possible that those in the Chairperson’s social network receive that information 
first. This could explain why one woman was able to prepare herself in time to 
stand for election. She could be part of the inner-circle. Women, however, have 
expressed that they are ready to take up leadership positions. What is lacking is 
the proper institutions and guidelines to ensure a public domain and good 
information flow. 
5.2 Decision making in CBNRM and who it benefits 
5.2.1 It’s the traditional Chief’s decision 
For convenience’s sake, the government has opted to work more with the CRBs who 
they feel represent the community. In an interview with DNPW staff, he felt it was 
difficult to work with everyone in the community and engage them in decision 
making. It is much easier when their representatives work with the government. “So, 
we involve communities through their representatives in the management of natural 
resources.” (P2: 20190211 DNPW 2:1) However, respondents from the community 
say that the Chief is the one who has the final say. The CRB suggests to the Chief 
what needs to be done and then the Chief decides.  
“The decision is made by the CRB after proposals are brought in from the 
communities through the VAGs. The decision is then taken to the chief who 
                                            
15 Ingonge Wina is Zambia’s first female Vice President who was elected in 2016 
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gives his approval. If it is not approved, we either have to find a way to 
convince him or rethink the whole idea.” (P15: 20190226 VAG2 15:23) 
 “The people that make the rules and law of natural resources are the CRB 
members and the Chief. Once the CRB makes these rules they take them to 
the Chief for approval if the Chief is happy with the rules that he signs and 
stamps them.” (P9: 20190215 VAG1 9:18) 
“The Chief has the power to make such decisions as well as decide on or 
suspend projects which he sees as not appropriate that the CRB has decided 
on. Then anything that he observes during the implementation of the project 
he has the power to call all of us and talk about what he has observed.” (P4: 
20190213 VAG1 4:33) 
 Not only does the Chief take over the decision-making process but he monitors 
and supervises projects that are implemented. This still as highlighted earlier can be 
linked to the amount of cultural capital the Chief holds. People in the community 
still respect the Chief’s authority because that is the tradition and people still follow 
the informal institutions. The recognition of the Chief as the patron has contributed 
to the legitimising of this authority. This means that the level of democracy depends 
on the benevolence of the Chief.  
5.2.2 It’s the CRB’s decision 
Regardless of who makes the final decision the CRB is mentioned to be involved in 
the decision-making process. The VAG committees and local community members 
are left out. Some attribute the VAG committees and community members being 
left out to the insufficient amount of money16 that the CRBs/community receives 
that comes from the Government. What is more, is that the CRB does not issue 
finance reports to the local community and so the community is left to speculate 
about how finances are used.  
“Communities get money from wildlife resources, but this money is small 
hence CRBs opt to do community projects. The key thing is to inform the 
community that money is not enough. If that information may be shared with 
everybody then people would still appreciate. This would create ownership 
with the communities but the way it happens even the VAG member find it 
hard to give information to the people because mainly things are done at the 
CRB levels. The VAG committee members seem to have no function. That is 
                                            
16 Money from safari hunting, and concession fees. 
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the reason there is poor participation because communities are not 
informed.” (P1: 20190206 DNPW 1:17) 
“The CRB does not give a financial report and the community doesn't even 
know the amount of money the CRB receives. It is difficult to challenge them 
because they say it is the government’s fault they haven't received the money. 
They said for the past two years they have not received any money.” (P6: 
20190214 VAG1 6:13) 
The CRB looks to be top-down because the VAG committees and local community 
members are left out of the decision-making process. This means CRB make the 
decision on which information to give the community and which to withhold. This 
has created room for elite control and capture because it makes it difficult for local 
communities to hold their leaders accountable. Therefore, the CRB is not 
representative of the local community. Additionally, the CRB does not have 
discretionary decision-making and fiscal power and so are able to use that to escape 
being held accountable. 
Revenues from trophy hunting concession fees are now paid to the Central 
Government before being disbursed. The money is sometimes delayed and not paid 
on time and in full. “The CRBs are supposed to receive money on a quarterly basis 
from government, that is, safari hunting revenues which are supposed to be 50-50. 
The Government does not release money on 50-50 if they release money this quarter 
it will take maybe another 6 months before more money is released.” (P3: 20190211 
DNPW 3:15) According to respondents, this affects the operating of the VAG and 
CRB. They make plans for community projects but are unable to carry them out. 
“The money that can be found at the VAG board is too little that we fail to work 
according to the way we plan so this makes it seem as though the VAG members do 
not want to work for the reasons they were chosen by the community.” (P4: 
20190213 VAG1 4:10) Some VAG committee members use this to their advantage 
in order to get re-elected. 
“To convince people to re-elect them, the board members tell the people 
about the challenges they face on the board, the little money they get as a 
VAG and reason they fail to deliver their promises. They use the lack of funds 
as a reason for not working and people are able to be convinced of that 
because they trust their leaders and so give them another chance. So those 
leaders would run away from work and instead concentrate on complaining 
about the problems they face on the board.” (P4: 20190213 VAG1 4:15) 
Here the lack of complete devolution of power is seen to be creating and reproducing 
elite control and possible elite capture. The elite use ‘trust’ or symbolic capital to 
evade sanctioning by the people. With the poor information flow, the elites can then 
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use the little money they receive or their position for self-benefit either legally or 
illegally. One VAG member narrated to me how the Chairperson would promise 
jobs to individuals who paid him a bribe. According to the respondent, he collected 
different ‘gifts’ from different people and then would choose who to give the jobs 
to. 
“The previous Chairperson wasn’t working well with the community because 
when employment opportunities came in the CRB he used corrupt methods to 
employ people. People had to give him maybe chickens or goats and out of 
all those that gave, he would only select 2 people and the rest would lose out. 
Even I before I joined the VAG this happened to me. There was a CRB vehicle 
that was bought, and they needed a driver, I approached the Chairman that I 
wanted to be the driver. He told me that I should bring him chickens because 
there are so many people who want that job, so I did as he asked. In the end, 
they chose someone else to be the driver. The Chairman was so corrupt that 
when money for building a food shelter was released from the CRB he used 
it for personal things.” (P7: 20190214 VAG1 7:18) 
The elite position of the Chairperson allowed him to use the resources for his 
own benefit. Because he was seen as someone with authority, he was able to 
manipulate others into giving him ‘gifts’ for favours. He was allegedly accumulating 
economic capital for himself because the system allowed him to be corrupt.  
The money received in the CRB is not shared equally among the VAGs. “The 
money is given to priority areas” (P20: 20190305 VAG3 20:12) in the form of 
community projects as mentioned. As a result, some VAGs are seen to be benefiting 
from the money more. “We should have been sharing whatever money we get at the 
CRB to all the VAGs equally so that each VAG can decide what to do with their 
share.” (P20: 20190305 VAG3 20:12) With no written rule on what constitutes 
‘priority area’ the sharing is mostly likely done to the benefit of those elites with the 
largest capital and bargaining power. Those that would be able to convince other 
board members that their area/village is a priority. It is also safe to assume that it 
makes it easier for traditional leadership to hijack this benefit-sharing process. 
Groups and committees that are created in the community are facing a similar 
challenge of favouritism and/or nepotism. In my interview with one of the NGO 
staff, he brought out that they encounter this problem in the Chiefdom.   
“We do have some challenges in the selection of those17 participants. There 
is too much favouritism. There are people that are holding those positions of 
influence so the selection in most cases you find out that it is not done on 
                                            




merit basis but is biasedly done because of maybe the connection that 
participant has with maybe the person on top or the person that has been 
charged with the responsibility of doing the selection.” (P25: 20190318 NGO 
25:5) 
Similarly, in the PRA group I did in VAG 1 with the women, they expressed the 
difficulty of joining development programmes and/or committees brought in by 
NGOs and other organisations.  
“Most of the groups like SMAGI18, COCOBA, and others have a limited 
number of people that can join once that number is reached no one else is 
allowed to join. They usually choose among themselves, for example, those 
doctors at the clinic they choose people that they know. The only groups that 
anyone can join freely without favouritism are the church groups. To join 
other groups, you have to have some sort of connection to that group or know 
someone in that group.” (P12: 2090219 PRA VAG 1 women group 12:1) 
Social networks or social capital plays a major role in the empowerment of elites. 
In both the interviews, it was highlighted that those at the ‘top’ pick people that are 
in their social network and not on merit basis. Similarly, during my data collection, 
the Chairperson was directing me to people in his social network for interviews until 
I realised it. In CBNRM or programmes aimed at fostering local democracy, there 
is a danger of diminishing citizenship. This is because community members may 
view certain programmes to be exclusively meant for elites and so will not 
participate. Formal institutions need to be established to guide benefit sharing as 
well as participation in programmes and committees to prevent elite control and 
capture. 
5.2.3 It’s the Government’s decision 
During my interview with DNPW staff, I wanted to find out how the community 
reacts when the Government makes a decision that the community does not like. In 
response, it seemed the Government had the overall authority over decisions made. 
The reason given is that the Government has a larger scope of interest than local 
communities or their local authorities, traditional or otherwise. Communities 
should, therefore, accept the decisions made by the Government because it is ‘for 
their own good’. 
“Overall government acts in the interest of every Zambian that’s why [on] 
some decisions, Government still retain the overall power over every 
resource. Communities do not look at the country at large they look at the 
                                            
18 SMAGI is a group formed for community maternal health education and financial support. 
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interest of themselves within their area. But the Government looks at the 
interest of every Zambian. No matter how much communities can push some 
decisions are made in the interest of the whole nation which includes 
themselves. So, if they are not happy with the decisions then they just have to 
live with it there is nothing they can do.” (P2: 20190211 DNPW 2:32) 
“Sometimes we can block them19 when they want to do a project which they 
don’t have enough money for even when they insist. We tell them to plough it 
back in to conservation by paying village scouts instead. We know that 
communities need more projects because their crops are being raided but if 
you plough back money in conservation you are multiplying wildlife.” (P3: 
20190211 DNPW 3:41) 
This is evidence that there isn’t discretionary decision-making power devolution. 
Additionally, the Government is able to influence this decision because they are 
signatories to the CRB bank accounts where revenues from wildlife are received. 
According to my DNPW respondents, this is to ensure accountability and collective 
decision-making. “This means that the communities themselves now cannot 
withdraw funds from their accounts. The consensus has to be struck between the 
community leadership (CRB) and the government staff. There has to be that 
consensus in order for the funds to be used.” (P2: 20190211 DNPW 2:10) I argue 
that it has had the opposite effect because elites can hide in the shadow of the 
government if they are not responsive to the people. 
Along with DNPW, the other signatories are the CRB Bookkeeper, the Finance 
Management Chairperson and the CRB Chairperson. In order to withdraw money, 
two community representatives have to sign along with a signatory from the DNPW. 
This means community representatives have to travel from their villages to town 
which is counted as an official duty. Since it is official duty they are entitled to 
allowances (travel and accommodation) and this is how the signatories benefit. All 
the signatories make the trip to ‘sign’ for the money. “They say that because for the 
CRB remove money there is a third signatory that come from the DNPW that has to 
agree on the payments to be made. If DNPW does not agree then they have to change 
the amount of money to be withdrawn and so to avoid this, they signatories are the 
ones that make the trip.” (P3: 20190211 DNPW 3:41) In this way, they exclude 
other CRB members from also benefiting from the travel and accommodation 
allowances.  
                                            
19 Referring to the CRB 
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5.3 Public interaction with elites 
5.3.1 Human-Animal conflict 
Human-Animal conflict (HAC) has been seen to be the biggest challenge faced in 
the communities. “In Nabwalya every year we have more than 500 HAC reports. 
Out of the 500 reports, you get may be 3-4 people killed from problem animals.” 
(P3: 20190211 DNPW 3:17) Animals are also responsible for crop damage, damage 
to houses and other property. The Government does not compensate for any loss of 
life or damage caused by the animals. “This puts us [DNPW] in a very awkward 
situation, the people are saying you like wildlife more than human beings.” (P3: 
20190211 DNPW 3:17) With these communities being predominately farmers their 
source of livelihood is affected and so in order to make money to feed their families 
and cover other costs like school fees they carryout illegal activities like illegal 
hunting (poaching) or illegal fishing. “Some people even use poison to fish, they 
dump poison into the stream and kill fish for food. They say that even if we teach 
them they have no other means to make money, they don't have any other thing to 
do. They say that is the only way they can make money so that they can take their 
children to school… They say if you give us jobs then we will stop all the illegal 
activities.” (P22: 20190305 VAG3 22:9) This is one way that communities protest 
the HAC and lack of compensation.  
Communities also depend on their CRBs to mitigate this HAC. They take all 
reports to the CRB through their Chairpersons and Resource Management officers 
who take those reports to the DNPW camp so that game scouts can be deployed to 
scare problem animals away. If this is not done, they vent their frustrations on the 
CRB members. One VAG member from VAG1 said, “This problem brings pressure 
on us CRB leaders because people bring the reports to us some of them insults 
depending on how they feel.” (P4: 20190213 VAG1 4:8) In the same vain, another 
member from VAG2 said that the community calls the problem animals the children 
of the CRB. They say to the CRB members "come and see what your children have 
done come and pick them and take them somewhere else" (P15: 20190226 VAG2 
15:9). Implying that CRBs take care of the animals as one would their own child. 
Even so, the community still needs the CRB to collect the HAC reports so that there 
can be mitigation.  
“The main reason we select these leaders is that we need them to attend to 
the HWC problem and take our reports to DNPW. Aside from that, I don't 
know any other work that they do because they don't hold meetings to explain 
what they do.” (P8: 20190214 VAG1 8:13) 
“It’s good to have the CRB because it makes things easy for us for example 
instead of taking reports of human wildlife conflict to DNPW camp we just 
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go to the CRB. We are able to get information quicker through the CRB 
because these people are within.” (P10: 20190215 VAG1 10:13) 
Human animal conflict mitigation is important for communities. VAG committee 
members and CRBs know this and so “are quick to respond to issues to do with 
HWC” (P7: 20190214 VAG 1 7:16). The CRB buys fireworks that they distribute 
to farmers to chase away animals from their fields. This could explain why they are 
mostly known for human-animal conflict mitigation. The DNPW and NGOs are also 
introducing HWC mitigation measures in the community like chili fencing of crop 
fields. They are doing this not only to reduce crop damage but to reduce retaliation 
from angry farmers. 
“I think what happens when a person is not seeing the benefits and then is 
also experiencing HWC then even the small things, day to day things that one 
can do to contribute to natural resource management he wouldn't do. For 
example, if someone offers them money for trees that are in the GMA this 
person wouldn't hesitate. They would directly go and do it to gain that money 
so that they can feel that they have benefited from natural resources.” (P26: 
20190319 NGO 26:20) 
From the evidence above, it can be observed that the community now categories 
the CRB in the same class as the top managed DNPW and NGO. They only go 
to them to report their problems and sometime throw insults to them even though 
the CRB members are people from the community experiencing the same HAC. 
The lack of a public domain has left the local community no choice but to engage 
in illegal activities such as illegal hunting to show their discontent with the 
management structure. Additionally, by the DNPW and NGO implement HAC 
mitigation measure (the job that the community sees is meant for the CRB) they 
are undermining the CRB’s authority and delegitimising them. This may lead to 
disengaged citizenship and further elite capitalisation of the boards. 
 5.3.2 Community meetings 
Depending on who you talk to, you will get different responses on issues to do with 
community meetings. VAG committee and CRB members say that community 
meetings are held in their respective VAGS or villages, but people do not attend 
them. The reason why people do not attend is debatable, but respondents said if a 
headman calls for a community meeting then people show up. One of the reasons 
given was that it is mandatory to attend a village meeting called by a headman. “If 
someone misses a meeting 3 times they can be taken to the Chief for punishment.” 




“Every month we have VAG committee meetings. We also have community 
meetings which we organise through the village headmen to inform people 
how we are working and how to protect our natural resources. We meet the 
community every 3 months.” (P18: 20190227 VAG2 18:9) 
The local community respects the Headman’s authority even though the rules are 
not formally written. This could be because of the strong informal rule that governs 
society whereas the CRB system is fairly new. People know the consequences of 
not attending the community meeting called by the headmen, but such consequences 
are lacking for CRB meetings. Ideally, this signifies that local community members 
recognise the Chief’s authority more than the CRBs or VAG committees’ authority.  
Another reason as to why community members may not attend meetings could 
be the lack of incentives. People expect to be provided with food for lunch because 
that is the trend in some group and NGO meetings. “In our group meetings like 
farmer's cooperatives, people are given food after meetings, so they expect the same 
to be done when the VAG committee calls for a meeting.” (P20: 20190305 VAG3 
20:4) With all the speculation and no clear information about the amount of money 
the CRB receives, the local community members maybe not attending meetings as 
a protest to how that money is used or mis-used.  
According to the respondents, the VAG committee use the community meetings 
to get community input on important decisions and set rules. They say that 
community at times are not happy with certain decision-making because they fail to 
attend meetings. “If community members do not show up the VAG committee makes 
decisions without their input” (P15: 20190226 VAG2 15:26) so there is a need for 
them to show up to give their input. What is interesting is that “If the community are 
not happy with the new rules [or decision made] they do not follow them for example 
if they say that no cutting of trees to make charcoal those not happy with this will 
continue to burn charcoal and sell secretly. (P9: 20190215 VAG1 9:19). The 
devolution of power goes as far as 10 board members found on the CRB. This fact 
may be influencing board member to hold a cosmetic community meeting to please 
not the community but the authorities that gave them that responsibility. That is why 
to them (CRB) it does not matter whether the community attends the meetings or 






In this chapter, I give the interpretations of the key findings in this study. The 
discussion links the findings to the conceptual framework presented in Chapter 3 on 
capital and choice and recognition. Reference is made to the existing literature on 
local democracy, community-based natural resource management, and elite control 
and capture. I conclude the sections with a key summary of my discussion to answer 
the two main research questions. 
6.1 How elites gain control over decision making 
6.1.1 Identifying the elite 
The Community Resources Board has been given the mandate over the whole 
chiefdom to manage natural resources, bring about community development and 
mitigate human-wildlife conflict. This was legally done with the introduction of the 
Zambia Wildlife Authority that saw the rights and decision making given to the 
CRB and not the VAGs. The CRBs were preceded by the Luangwa Integrated 
Resource Development programme (LIRDP) and the Administrative Management 
Design (ADMADE) (Child, 2004). The LIRDP was the more democratic of the two 
with the decision-making authority being the VAGs. The VAGs were given 
discretionary power through the decision making and fiscal power making them 
responsive to the needs of the villagers (Ribot, 2013). 80% of the hunting revenues 
were given to the VAGs and shared equally among the villages (Lubilo and Child, 
2010). The villages were engaged, and this created a sense of ownership and respect 
for the natural resources and the system.  Out of the 20 National parks in Zambia, 
this pilot programme was only tested in the South Luangwa National Park 
ecosystem (Child 2004).  
Unlike the LIRDP, the ADMADE was rolled out in the whole country which 
should explain why it is the framework that the CRB was based on (Lubilo and 
Child, 2010).  The difference with the CRB was that ‘democratic’ elections were 
introduced and the decision-making was meant to be collective. The CRB was 
intended to have a bottom-up approach in order to foster democracy. By making it 
representative of the local community, it would have a wide public domain 
encouraging citizenship engagement (Ribot, 2013). Additionally, it was meant to 
curb opportunist behaviour by having accountability measures. This means that 
elites would not be able to use the system to accumulate capital for themselves 
further widening their control as in the case of the traditional leadership in the 
ADMADE programme. 
In the ADMADE programme, however, the chief was the deciding authority 
through the sub-authorities which reduced the size of the public domain, diminished 
citizenship, and promoted elite capture (Child 2004, Ribot et al. 2008, Ribot 2013). 
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Following my definition of elites, traditional chiefs are elites because they have 
control and access to the resources in their chiefdom such as land, water, and 
subjects (community members). I call them subjects because due to culture and 
tradition they follow the chief and believe in the chiefs’ sovereignty. These are 
unwritten rules or informal institutions that governed the local community (Mbewe, 
2007). ADMADE was the beginning of the legitimisation of that authority. The 
Chief only chose people that he trusted to be on the sub-authority and was able to 
make decisions without consultation. When there was a misappropriation of funds 
(Lubilo and Child 2010), it was difficult to sanction a Chief because of the capital 
they possess in the Chiefdom. They are the custodians of the land and have been 
given this mandate through the land tenure system. This contributes to the local 
people’s inability to challenge the Chief’s authority. The land tenure system subjects 
people to the accountability relations, beliefs, and behaviour of the elite entrusted 
with that land. In this case the Chief. In addition, because of culture and tradition, 
institutions still being widely used, the Chief has large cultural capital and is seen 
as someone who is entitled to respect, obedience, and other resources.  
The creation of the CRB may also be viewed as a way to ‘control’ the 
misappropriation of funds by the chief, however, this came with unintended 
consequences. It signified the transfer of power from the Chief and his indunas to 
other local elites, in the process forming and/or strengthening them [elites] (Ribot 
et al., 2008). Similar to the traditional leaders in the ADMADE programme, this 
recognition of the CRB as an authority enforces the behaviour of the board members 
to other community members. This is evident from the narratives on the background 
of the chairpersons. It is observed that the system may either be democratic or 
autocratic depending on the beliefs, values, and principles of the elite in-charge 
(Ribot, 2013). Additionally, it produces and reproduces elitism20. As the respondent 
from DNPW put it “Some gain interest because they see the benefit the chairperson 
enjoys and so would like that position.” (P1: 20190206 DNPW 1:26) This shows 
local community members observe elites and how they represent them but instead 
of objecting their behaviour they would like to take up those positions. This could 
be because the public domain is diminished and so each citizen wants to benefit 
themselves however they can at the expense of others (Wilfahrt, 2018). 
Looking at the four narratives given by the former and current CRB leadership, 
one can easily observe that they have in common the large amounts of symbolic 
capital (Inglis and Thorpe, 2012). This symbolic reputation has come about through 
the accumulation of economic, social or cultural capital by the elites. They have 
built a reputation for themselves in the community and so people in the community 
always look to them to take up leadership positions. They are all involved in at least 
                                            
20 Elitism is the practice and belief in rule by an elite (source: www.dictionary.com) 
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2-3 committees or groups in the community which is one of the characteristics as 
shown in table 2.  
Table 2.  highlights some characteristics that can be used to identify elites. This 
summary was the result of the survey that was carried out in the quantitative part of 
the study. The result corresponds with the qualities of CRB and VAG committee 
members that were interviewed in the qualitative part of the study. Elites are mostly 
male because of the poor participation of women in CBNRM. They are between 35-
55 years old probably because the CRB election guidelines require a candidate to 
be 25years or older. This rule is not followed strictly because members below age 
25years are present on the CRBs and VAG committees. Another likely explanation 
is that they have the energy to gain economic, social capital and cultural. Meaning 
they can be the most ‘active’ in the community. A quality people look for in their 
leaders. Additionally, because they have lived in the area for more than 10 years, it 
is possible that they have built a good reputation or symbolic capital in their villages. 
All are or have been married which shows just how much the local communities 
still follow their informal institutions. Marriage for the local communities signifies 
that someone is mature and responsible. If they can manage a family then they can 
manage a leadership role. Lastly, it can be observed just how much social, economic 
and cultural capital these elites on the board possess. They are leaders of 2-3 other 
committees in their villages, have more than one source of income, and have 
attained secondary education. 
Table 2. Showing statistics of the CRBs in the North Luangwa Ecosystem highlighting key 
characteristics of elites 
Gender Frequency Percent 
 Male 35 87.5 
Female 5 12.5 
Total 40 100.0 
Age range (yrs.) Frequency Percent 
18-35 14 35.0 
35-55 23 57.5 
55+ 3 7.5 
Total 40 100.0 
Marital status Frequency Percent 
Married lives with spouse 39 97.5 
Divorced 121 2.5 
Total 40 100.0 
                                            
21 This respondent turned out to be part of the CRB secretariat who is employed by the CRB and 
not elected by the local community. 
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Years in village Frequency Percent 
2-10 2 5.0 
11-20 11 27.5 
21-30 9 22.5 
31-40 11 27.5 
41-50 5 12.5 
51-60 2 5.0 
Total 40 100.0 
Education Frequency Percent 
Primary 9 22.5 
Secondary 30 75.0 
College 1 2.5 
Total 40 100.0 
More than one source of income Frequency Percent 
Yes 24 60.0 
No 16 40.0 
Total 40 100.0 
No. of leadership positions in other Groups Frequency Percent 
1 6 15.0 
2 14 35.0 
3 14 35.0 
4 4 10.0 
5 2 5.0 
Total 40 100.0 
 
Being in more than one group or committee comes with incentives most of the 
time especially if the groups/committees are introduced by an external organisation 
such as an NGO. ‘Volunteering’ in these committees has led to elites accumulating 
considerable amounts of economic, social, and cultural capital which the local 
community recognise and value. Furthermore, because of their acquired symbolic 
capital, the elites are able to use the capital to get themselves into different other 
groups and committees from which they can derive more benefits.  In some positions 
like the CRB, they are able to seize new opportunities first in the community 
because they are ‘the main point of entry’ as stated by NGO staff.  
The other thing the four narratives have in common is that the actors involved 
have the backing of the traditional Chief. Showing that just like in the ADMADE 
programme, those found on the CRB are people that are trusted by the Chief. In the 
fourth narrative, the Chairperson was asked by the chief to recontest going against 
the ‘no-third term’ rule of the CRB. This shows that local community members will 
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follow the words of the Chief before they follow formal institutions. Especially if it 
benefits them. 
It can be observed that VAG elections are centred on the Chairperson position. 
The Chairperson position is seen as the most prestigious because of the benefits it 
comes with. On top of having popularity, the Chairperson is in-charge and can give 
orders to other committee members. The positions are also associated with someone 
who is educated as prescribed by the selection criteria even though it may not be the 
case. The VAG election is mainly for choosing the Chairpersons the rest of the 
positions are filled up by an in-house election. Similarly, on the CRB the 10 elected 
Chairpersons have an in-house election to give themselves positions. This process 
is undemocratic because it does not foster citizenship and has led to elite control 
(Ribot et al., 2008). Since these VAG Chairpersons have been able to retain their 
positions on the VAGs they always take up the same positions on the CRB each 
time which elite control is. 
The CRB is made up of the Chairpersons of the VAGs and they are the first ones 
to receive the date of nominations and the nomination forms. When it comes to 
elections it means they have a head start. This possibly has contributed to elite 
capture. Some respondents accused VAG Chairpersons of withholding this 
information in order to keep control of their positions. If not for themselves, they 
may use this information to get people from their social network in to those 
positions.  
The elections are carried out by DNPW and FZS while the Chief has the authority 
to approve or reject applications. The choice to give the Chief this authority 
diminishes citizenship because the community has limited rights to choose who they 
want to lead. The Chief may remove a strong contender to ensure that his favourite 
choice wins the ‘election’.  Because of the Chiefs power and authority (from 
informal and formal institutions), any opposition to his decision means that the 
elections may be cancelled. That is if anyone would even think about challenging 
that authority. The difference in capitals has led to a symbolic interaction where 
those with lower capitals do not see the need or have the will to challenge such 
authority (Ojha, 2008, Swarts, 1997).  
During the election, money may or may not be a factor in determining the results 
of the elections. In areas where the local community is engaged and want to shape 
the polity (Isin and Turner, 2002), money or economic capital of a candidate is less 
likely to be a factor. People will likely choose leaders that can transform that 
economic capital into social capital to help them achieve their goals. If that 
citizenship is diminished, then the local community will seek any opportunity to 
benefit themselves and so their votes will be for sale.   
Women participation is low on the VAG and almost none existent on the CRB. 
The men in the local community dominate the women because women have low 
economic, social, and cultural capital (Inglis and Thorpe, 2012, Bourdieu, 1993). 
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Historically in these local communities or following the informal institutions, men 
are the providers of the family and so are in better positions to make money 
(economic capital), create social networks (social capital), and gain new knowledge 
and insights (cultural capital). This is not to say that women do not accumulate 
capital as well. They capital that they collect is not the relevant type to get them into 
the CRB or VAG committees. It is only when they collect relevant capital like 
information on the date of nominations for CRB election can they stand a chance to 
be part of the elites. 
The husbands may not allow their wives to stand because they do not want to 
lose their symbolic capital or reputation in the community. Because the CRB and 
VAG are already male dominated, it means their wives would be travelling with 
men to attend important meetings in towns. As brought out by respondents, the 
husbands are worried about the rumours that might spread in the community about 
their wives with other men leading them to ‘lose face’ in the community. To save 
themselves from the embarrassment or social and cultural capital loss, they would 
rather their wives stay home. As noted in the findings, women who have experience 
and exposure have better bargaining power with their husbands and are more likely 
to disagree with the husband’s decision. In the interest of promoting democracy 
women should be empowered with social, economic, and cultural capital to ensure 
that they are engaged citizens in CBNRM. This can be done by having policies and 
guidelines that ensure minimum social standards (Saito-Jensen et al. 2010). 
Furthermore, women lack resources to campaign possibly because of traditional 
gender roles that are followed to some extent in the local communities. The man is 
the provider of the family and women are the care givers. This translates to men and 
women accumulating different types of capital in their daily activities. That, as 
highlighted earlier on, may be more relevant in a given field than others. Single 
women have better chances of accumulating the same type of relevant capital 
needed for CRB positions as men or elites because they may have much more time 
or freedom. This would explain why it was noted that the women found on the 
VAGs are usually single women.  
Lastly, women are made to feel inferior even when the make it to the VAG 
committee or CRB because it is already male dominated. It could be that in trying 
to keep her symbol or image in the community as a ‘good’ woman she will play the 
traditional woman role of ensuring the man or breadwinner’s happiness. 
Alternatively, it could be because traditional gender roles stipulate that a woman is 
not allowed to talk where men are present as some of my respondents alluded to. 
They may not take part in discussions or decision making because of this. More 
should be done on this subject to promote local democracy and ensure women are 
included in decision-making processes. 
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6.1.2 Decision making 
The findings show that even though CRBs have legally been given the mandate to 
manage the natural resources (Government of Zambia, 2015), the Chief has the final 
say on the decisions being made in the Chiefdom. This is because of the capital the 
Chief has through the customary land tenure system and traditional 
practices/institutions. In the role of patron, the Chief is allowed to monitor and 
supervise project implementation which further legitimizes his authority as ruler of 
the Chiefdom. This recognition of authority ensures that the Chief can enjoy access 
to resources further gaining capital and enforcing his beliefs and way of ruling to 
the local communities including the CRB.  
Elites in the community, therefore, work to gain the trust of the Chief using their 
capital because they want leadership roles such as the Chairperson positions in the 
VAG and/ or CRB. This then can be seen as leading to elite control. Elite capture of 
resources develops when the VAG committee and CRB benefit themselves by 
accumulating capital at the expense of the local community members (Khan, 2012, 
Inglis and Thorpe, 2012). This is likely to happen because of insufficient amounts 
of money given to the CRB from the government. As a result, local community 
members cannot sanction their leaders because they cannot be held accountable. 
Additionally, the leaders/elites gain large amounts of capital that make them seem 
like the ideal candidate to lead and so go unchallenged. 
 Local community members may not also be engaged because funds are too little 
to meet community needs in addition to poor accountability because the allegedly 
CRB does not give financial reports. It is also difficult to hold them accountable 
because they may blame the Government for not paying them on time and in full. 
Discretionary fiscal power is not present because the money is first paid to the 
central Government before being paid to the CRB. As reported, board members use 
these challenges to get re-elected because ‘it is not their fault’. Meanwhile, they are 
accumulating economic, social and cultural capital (Inglis and Thorpe, 2012) on 
these boards through allowances, interactions with NGOs and private businesses 
and training workshops further making them the preferred candidates in VAG 
elections.  
The results of the poor accountability and partial devolution of power has led to 
poor engagement from citizens in this system (Ribot, 2004). This has made the 
citizens or local community to look for other means in which they can also benefit 
from the natural resources such as illegal hunting and selling of their vote during 
CRB elections. They also do this by trying to gain favour from the elites in-charge, 
in this case, the CRB members. The CRB members try to gain favour from higher 
elites such as the Chief. Furthermore, because of poor accountability and poor 
devolution of power, some CRB and VAG committee members may use their 
positions for their own benefit. For example, the previous Chairperson in VAG1 
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was accused of promising jobs for bribes and used project money for ‘personal 
things’.  
Social interaction with elites pays off to a few in the community. Groups and 
committee that are created in the community are facing a challenge of favouritism 
and nepotism. The people holding influential positions are seen to make selections 
based on their social relations and corruption, not on merit basis. This is elite capture 
(Beard and Phakphian, 2009). According to the respondents, the only groups that 
anyone can join freely are the church groups probably because in the church group 
there isn’t any monetary benefit. People here are more likely to benefit from social 
interactions that help them gain social capital. To join other groups that have 
monetary or physical benefits you need connections to someone in those groups. 
Connections made in social interactions in the church groups as the Chairperson of 
VAG1 possibly used from being the music director.  
The ‘Government has overall power on every resource.’ This statement by the 
DNPW staff shows that the CBNRM in the GMAs is centralised and there is poor 
local democracy. The statement means that the Government has not devolved power 
which includes decision making and fiscal power to the local communities because 
‘Government acts in the interest of all Zambians while local communities act in their 
own interest’ therefore communities must ‘respect’ the Government’s decisions. 
These statements could be interpreted that the Government is not willing to let 
citizens influence the decision-making process and this diminishes the citizenship. 
This is characteristic of autocracies (Agrawal and Ribot, 1999, Ribot et al., 2008).  
The Government blocks the CRB when they want to do a development project 
that they want because the government feels they don’t have enough money. This 
takeaway the representativeness of the CRB to the community because they are 
unable to respond to immediate community needs. The Government is able to do 
this because they are signatories to the CRB bank accounts. This shows the lack of 
discretionary fiscal power. However, the reason given by DNPW respondents for 
this is to ensure accountability and collective decision making. This could be argued 
that it has had the opposite effect in that leaders can no longer be sanctioned by their 
communities and because communities are not involved in decision making they are 
not engaged citizens (Ribot, 2013). The lack of fiscal devolution has instead led to 
elite control and sometimes capture as the findings suggest. A few individuals are 
able to accumulate different capitals because they cannot be sanctioned. For 
example, consensus between Government and the CRB has to be reached before the 
money is withdrawn from the CRB account and so the signatories which are the 
book keeper, finance management chairperson and CRB Chairperson have to travel 
to town for this process. The trip attracts monetary allowances and so they benefit 
from it as well as social interaction with Government and NGOs. The trips are 
justified because they are the ones that need to negotiate with DNPW on the amount 
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to with draw in the process accumulate capital that they can use to stay in power and 
capture new opportunities in the community. 
To answer the question of how the elites gain control over decision making 
processes it can be observed that capital, policy, and institutions play a central role. 
Elites will use their capital to gain control of partially democratic or autocratic 
institutions. This might lead to elite capture depending on the behaviour, 
accountability relations and beliefs of the elite (Ribot et al., 2018). In democratic 
institutions, it is difficult for elites to gain control. This is because democracies are 
representative of the community cultivating citizenship through the public domain 
(Ribot, 2013). The public domain makes it hard for elites to accumulate capital 
because citizens influence the public authorities. Elite use capital to get into 
positions of power and because the system is not democratic they use those positions 
to accumulate more capital and also empower other elites in their social network. 
Policies that ensure the growth and support of the public domain, and encourage 
citizenship by being representative are important to ensure that elites are not 
empowered (Saito-Jensen et al., 2010, Öjendal and Dellnäs, 2013). 
6.2 Conditions under which elites are responsive to the public 
6.2.1 The public interaction with elites 
Human-Animal conflict is apparently one of the biggest challenges that the 
community in the Chiefdom is facing. Animals, in addition to taking human life, 
damage crops, houses, and other property. The Government does not compensate 
for any loss of life or damage caused by the animals. Being farmers, crops are the 
main source of livelihood for the community. Once the crops are damaged they have 
to look for other means to get food and money to take their children to school. As a 
result, they end up doing illegal activities like poaching or illegal fishing in protest 
(Lubilo, 2018). ‘If they give us jobs then we will stop all the illegal activities.’ (P22: 
20190305 VAG3 22:9)  
In a way, this shows that despite having a system that is not decentralised, not 
democratic, and filled with elite control and capture, citizens are able to engage their 
leaders. They use illegal means because the public domain is small and so are unable 
to identify themselves with the public authority and other citizens (Lubilo, 2018). 
Others in the community who are still positively engaged citizens depend on the 
CRB to help in mitigating human-animal conflict. They say the main reason they 
select the CRB is that they need them to take reports of cases to the DNPW camp. 
This means that they have either lost confidence in the CRB to carry out their other 
functions of natural resource management and community development or are 
unaware of the CRB’s other duties. Respondents were aware of the role of the CRB 
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and so it is safe to assume that people have chosen to engage the CRB only on 
matters on which they feel the CRB can respond to. 
The local community members also voice their frustrations to the CRB on 
occasion blaming them of being just like the DNPW in caring for animals more than 
people. Calling the wild animals, the ‘children’ of the CRB shows that they [local 
community] do not feel the ownership of those animals probably because they do 
not benefit much from them. The VAG committees and CRB are quick to respond 
to human-animal conflict cases. This may be because they understand the 
importance of this issue to the local community or because people actively engage 
the CRB with insults and possibly physical violence. In either case, the CRB 
members accumulate or lose symbolic capital depending on how they respond to 
this problem. When they have the money, they buy fireworks to distribute to farmers 
making them appear to be responsive. They can also use this as a trade-off to gain 
votes in the next election.  
The sharing of benefits is not equal, and this could be due to the little amount of 
money they receive from the Central Government. The CRB member with the most 
capital is likely to convince others that their VAG is a ‘priority’. This could explain 
why some VAGs are seen to be benefiting more from the natural resources than 
other as expressed by VAG 3 respondents.  
With HAC being a big challenge, the DNPW and NGOs introduce HAC 
mitigation measures to reduce crop damage and protect wildlife. This further 
diminishes the representativeness of the CRB leading to poor engagement from 
citizens. As can be observed from the PRA results in figure 3, 4, and 5 in Appendix 
1, the CRB is considered less important in the community than NGOs and other 
organisations. 
When the VAG committee and CRB call for a community meeting the 
attendance by the community is poor unlike when the headmen call for a meeting. 
One of the apparent reasons is that for the headmen meeting, attendance is 
mandatory, so people have to show up. It attracts punishment from the Chief if 
someone misses 3 consecutive meetings. Even though the Chief is seen as the 
authority figure in the community, there is still a possibility of losing symbolic 
capital on their part [Chief]. The Chief must ensure that there is a show of 
community engagement, possibly to his indunas22, with citizens to maintain his 
popularity (capital) as well. By calling for the community meeting through the 
headmen, the Chief tries to show that he still listens to his subjects and so these are 
made mandatory. The VAG committees and CRB does not have such authority as 
observed and so they now resort to working with the headmen whenever they want 
to call a meeting or utilise the headmen’s meetings whenever they need to.  
                                            
22 These are the Chief’s tribal council. 
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Another reason for the poor attendance is that people are not given any incentives 
to attend the meeting like they are given in meetings organised by NGOs or farmer’s 
cooperative groups. As the Chairperson for VAG 3 explained: “Some people do not 
attend meetings and they only do so when they hear there is a special occasion 
because they know there will be money.” Further, “People in the community think 
that the VAG has a lot of money so when they don't see any community development 
projects being done they think that we are misusing of stealing that money.” (P20: 
20190305 VAG3 20:18) The people in the community want a share of the money 
that they think the VAG committee members enjoy. They want to benefit too and 
have a sense of belonging and so protest by being absent from the meetings.  
The VAG committees say they use these community meetings to get the 
communities input on projects to implement in the Chiefdom, but it may be a way 
to ensure that communities are seen to be kept informed and involved so that they 
do not lose their reputation and symbolic capital needed for re-election. The 
committee members want to be seen doing the right thing not only by the locals but 
also by other stakeholders such as the Government and NGOs. After all, this will 
help them get into other committee boards or community projects. This is more 
likely the case because as noted if people don’t show up, the VAG committees go 
ahead and make the plans on their own. What happens after is that the community 
may not be happy with their plans or rules created but it wouldn’t matter because 
the VAG committee ‘put in an effort’. If the community is not happy they exclude 
themselves from the decisions or rules and possibly CRB elections. This means by 
default the same leaders make it back on to the CRB.  
The elites are seen to be responsive to the public in two types of conditions. The 
first condition is where they are representative of the community. They community 
should be able to reward or punish the elites through sanctions depending on their 
responsiveness to community needs (Fischer, 2016). For this, it is important that the 
leaders are given discretionary power both in decision making and monetary terms 
after the strengthening of the public domain.  Secondly, elites are responsive to the 
public in situations where they are at risk of losing symbolic capital or their 
reputations which threatens their ability to stay in positions of power not only in 
democracies (Wilfahrt, 2018) but in autocracies as well. The Chief is responsive to 





In this chapter, I give a summary of the key findings for this research based on the 
research questions explaining how this study adds to existing knowledge. After 
which, I outline the limitations of this study with regards to the research design and 
methodology. What follows is the implications for policy and practice and lastly, I 
give suggestions for further studies. 
7.1 Summary of key findings- contribution to literature 
The findings in this thesis ‘unpack the elite’ in community-based natural resources 
management by providing important insights on who they are, their varying 
backgrounds, and how they seek to maintain their positions of power.  
The creation of the Community Resource Boards has brought today’s elites in 
community-based natural resources management. The CRBs have been given the 
mandate to manage natural resources, bring about community development and 
mitigate human-animal conflict in the boundaries of their Chiefdoms. The choice to 
devolve this power to 10 local community members found on this board has led to 
the creation and promotion of local elites. This is because they are able to benefit 
by accumulating economic, social, and cultural capital for themselves in their local 
community. They use this accumulated capital to build a reputation for themselves 
which opens up more opportunities for the few to benefit even further. 
 CRBs were preceded by the Luangwa Integrated Resource Development 
Programme (LIRDP) and the Administrative Management Design (ADMADE). 
The LIRDP was more democratic than the ADMADE programme because it 
devolved discretionary decision making and fiscal power to all in the local 
community through the village action groups. The ADMADE programme supported 
the tradition leadership through sub-authorities legitimising this informal institution 
in the process. However, the ADMADE was the framework that the CRB was built 
on. The difference was that the Government devolved power to elected local 
representatives instead of the traditional authorities. This, however, did not take in 
to consideration the social structures and capital relations within the communities 
and consequently transferred power that belonged to the traditional leadership in the 
ADMADE program to other local elites. Instead of following the LIRDP which was 
the more democratic model, rights and powers were devolved to 10 board members 
in order to maintain government control. It is easier to control 10 board members 
that a whole community.  
Looking are the background of elites it was evident that elites understand what 
qualities people look for in their leaders. They build a reputation according to those 
needs. Organisations that implement community development projects are always 
looking for ‘active’ members of society and so elites in the community have better 
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chances of making their way in to committees or boards. Once on these community 
development boards the accumulate even more symbolic capital which they use to 
get into other positions on different boards. Symbolic capital can also be used to 
drive ‘political’ change on the CRB and other community development committees. 
Elites are able to mobilise the community to remove other elites from power 
depending on their influence and amount of symbolic capital. The formal institution 
also helps drive this process along smoothly. Popularity and capital play a major 
role in getting into positions of power but having good social relations with the 
Traditional Chief is an advantage. This Traditional elite still has influence and 
authority over the formal institutions like the CRB. This authority comes from both 
informal institutions like traditions and formal institutions like the land tenure 
system.  
The CRB elections are described to be ‘democratic’ which is not true. In the 
nomination periods, applicants have to undergo a screening process by DNPW and 
the Chief in order to be allowed to stand. The Chief has the final decision on who is 
allowed to stand or not. This is problematic because the Chief is likely to install his 
inner-circle on the board of which the evidence seems to suggest is true. What is 
more is that with the current CRB election guidelines, the local community only get 
to choose who the VAG Chairperson should be. The election on the CRB is done 
through an in-house election. The newly elected VAG chairpersons decide which 
position to give themselves. This has led to elite control and elite capture. The whole 
process diminishes the public domain and reduces citizenship. 
To win elections elites portray themselves in the community as humble, 
respectful, social, law abiding and free of witchcraft. If that fails, then during 
election campaigns they use their monetary capital to buy votes from local 
community members. This is problematic because it leads to people selecting 
unqualified leaders. The problem is that there are no regulations that govern the 
election campaigns and so candidate use any means possible to win votes. 
The VAG elections are centred on the chairperson position and elites have taken 
note of this fact. They only want to join the VAG committee to get the Chairperson 
positions and don’t see the point of having any other position. The Chairperson 
position has become prestigious. Only those that have high education 
(institutionised cultural capital) now are allowed to contest for this position. This 
has made it even harder for other local community members to challenge elites and 
to make the process democratic. 
It is evident from the finding that women’s participation in the CRB and VAG 
committee is low. Women are scared to stand because their husbands do not allow 
them to and because they lack the confidence and resources to stand and campaign. 
Over promotion of the Chairperson position has also contributed to the low self-
confidence levels. Even when women do manage to get on the VAG committee and 
CRB they do not actively participate in the governance processes and decision-
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making. It was however noted that women with exposure and experience become 
less dependent on their husband in this patriarchal system and have better bargaining 
power. They are able to convince their husband to let them stand because they build 
up relevant symbolic capital. Poor information distribution contributes to the poor 
participation of women. What is lacking is the proper institutions and guidelines to 
ensure a large public domain for good information flow. 
For convenience, the Government has chosen to work with the CRB in CBNRM 
who they feel represent the community. However, respondents from the community 
say that the Chief is the one who has the final decision-making power. The CRB 
suggest to the Chief, who is the patron, what needs to be done and then the Chief 
decides. The CRB is mentioned to be involved while the VAG committee and 
community members are left out in this ‘democratic’ process. The CRB makes the 
decision on which information to give the community and which to withhold. This 
has created elite control and capture of resources and leaders cannot be held 
accountable as a result. It doesn’t help that the CRB does not have discretionary 
decision-making and fiscal power. They escape sanctions because of this. The 
Government has overall decision-making power because according to them they 
have the interest of the whole nation and not just one community. I argue that this 
has had the opposite effect because elites can hide in the shadow of the government 
if they are not responsive to the needs of the people. 
Human-Animal conflict has been seen to be the biggest challenge faced in the 
communities. With a lack of compensation, the communities have turned to illegal 
activities like illegal hunting and fishing. This is a protest because they lack a public 
domain in which citizens can be engaged to foster belonging and ownership of 
natural resources. HAC mitigation is important for communities. The elites on the 
CRB know this and so are quick to respond to issues related to it to preserve their 
reputation. DNPW and NGOs also implement HAC mitigation measure, a job 
entrusted to the CRBs, this undermines the CRBs authority. It leads to diminishing 
citizenship and further elite capitalisation of resources. Evidently, local community 
members do not attend CRB and VAG meetings. They do, however, attend headmen 
meetings which are mandatory. The local community respects the Headman’s 
authority even though the rules are not formally written. This signifies that people 
recognise the Chief’s authority more than the CRBs or VAG committees’ authority. 
The CRB uses community meetings for getting input to make decisions. If the 
people do not show up they go ahead and make the decision without them. The fact 
the decision-making was entrusted to 10 board member makes the community 
meeting seem cosmetic. People may have realised this and so shun the meeting and 
it is reinforced when the CRB makes decisions without the people’s input.  
This study has contributed to the literature on elites with a focus on local natural 
resources management. By understanding who the elites are, I add insight into how 
mechanisms of elite control and capture operate. Elites use their capital (economic, 
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social, and cultural) (Bourdieu, 1993, Inglis and Thorpe, 2012) to gain control of 
democratic and undemocratic institutions. Whether the leads to elite capture 
depends on the behaviour, accountability relations and beliefs of the elite (Ribot et 
al., 2008). In democratic institutions, however, elites have a difficult time 
controlling or capturing resources because the public domain ensures that citizens 
are engaged and hold their leaders accountable through positive and negative 
sanctions. Elites are responsive to the public in circumstances where they face 
sanctions and in situations where they risk losing or have an opportunity of gaining 
symbolic capital (Wilfahrt, 2018). This is because elites are built on capital 
accumulation and work to maintain this capital. This makes elites to respond to 
public needs even in autocratic institutions. Policies that foster democracy are 
important to ensure elites are not empowered (Öjendal and Dellnäs, 2013). 
7.2 Limitations of the study 
The choice of methodology in this study helped me to collect empirically rich data 
relevant for answering the two main research questions. However, l was not able to 
access some areas in the Chiefdom because of the inaccessibility due to bad roads 
and in the rainy season. Because of the rain, it was difficult setting up interviews 
and sometimes respondents would not show up because of this.  
Having worked in the area for 3 years, it was likely that some respondents 
thought I was still representing the NGO I used to work for. I was aware of my bias 
and ensured that it did not affect the data that I collected. This was evident during 
my sampling of respondent were, as if by instinct, my first contact in the community 
was with the CRB chairperson. Having the view of both NGO staff and student 
research helped me quickly realise this and helped me to change my methods to 
randomly selecting participants and following up on interesting topics.  
My link to my former work would have created a bias in the PRAs that were 
focused on identifying the institutions and organisations working in the areas and 
their importance to the local community. Especially because my note taker was from 
an NGO that works in the area. I made sure that the study was not tied to the NGO 
by informing and reminding the respondents that I was doing the research for my 
Masters degree. I feel this reduced the bias of respondents making that NGO seem 
more important than other organisations, but I do not rule out the possibility that it 
did affect the responses. The respondents may have exaggerated the importance of 




7.3 Implications for policy and practice 
This study revealed how elites gain control over decision making processes in 
community-based natural resources management. Further, it revealed the conditions 
under which elites are responsive to the public. The findings indicate that policy that 
takes in to account the capital relations in the local community is necessary. There 
should be a review of the policy to devolve discretionary decision-making and fiscal 
power to the village action groups (VAGs) instead of the CRB. This will help to 
make the VAG leadership representative of the community by making them 
accountable and responsive to the needs of the community. In doing so this will 
promote the growth of the public domain and increase citizenship within the local 
communities (Ribot, 2013).  
Decentralisation will lead to better local democracy. One point of entry would 
be to assess the Luangwa Integrated Resource Development project (LIRDP) to 
learn of the successes and challenges and how they can be applicable in today’s 
context (Child, 2004). On the fiscal devolution of power, the Department of 
National Parks and Wildlife should no longer be signatories to the Community 
accounts because this creates room for elite capture and corruption. The 
Government should instead provide relevant audit queries to ensure good financial 
management. There should be clear sanctions that reward or punish leaders in 
relation to how the carry out their duties (Fischer, 2016). 
I also suggest a review of the CRB election guidelines to remove the focus on 
the Chairperson position. This has contributed to the re/production of elites because 
it has become a symbol of authority in the local communities. Every position on the 
VAG should be contested by willing candidates equally and the role of each position 
should be clearly outlined. The process of screening by the traditional Chief should 
be removed from the CRB election guidelines in order to create engaged citizenship 
within the community. Lastly, there should be some regulations put in place for the 
campaign period to discourage vote buying. The elites in the community will always 
be present but a decentralised and democratic system will ensure that they do not 
control decision-making processes hence prevent elite capture. 
7.4 Suggestions for further studies 
My findings revealed further interesting issues in relation to local democracy and 
community-based natural resources management. For the purpose of this study, I 
focused on the findings that were most relevant for answering my research questions 
and related to my research problem. I suggest a few topics next for further research. 
• Further research to explore traditional elites in community-based natural 
resource management. 
• To explore further how capital contributes to women being marginalised in 
community-based natural resources management. 
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• To explore how the transformation of the parastatal Zambia Wildlife 
Authority into the Government Department of National Parks and wildlife 
has affected local democracy and community-based natural resources 
management in Zambia. 
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9.0 APPENDIX 1. PRA RESULTS 
 
 





Figure 4. PRA results in VAG 2 Women's group top, Men's group bottom (Photo: Gilbert Mwale) 
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Figure 5. PRA results in VAG 3 Women's group top, men's group bottom (Photo: Gilbert Mwale) 
